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ABSTRACT
Essays on the Weather Derivatives Market
by
Daniel Weagley
Co-Chairs: Associate Professor Amiyatosh Purnanandam and Professor Tyler Shumway
This dissertation consists of two essays examining the functioning and effects of a
recent financial innovation: the weather derivatives market. The modern weather
derivatives market originated in the late 1990s and allows participants to share non-
catastrophic weather risks. The structure and development of the market provide a
relatively clean empirical setting to study and better understand financial markets.
The first essay examines how financial sector stress affects asset prices in the
weather derivatives market. The structure of the market allows price movements due
to financial sector stress to be disentangled from price movements due to fundamen-
tals. Estimated risk premiums, which are small and statistically indistinguishable
from zero on average, are 31% per year during the 2008-09 financial crisis. Contracts
with greater margin requirements and idiosyncratic risk experience larger increases in
risk premiums. Open interest falls by 40%. The results provide evidence that adverse
shocks to the capital of financial institutions lead to increased hedging costs for end
users and less risk sharing in the economy.
The second essay examines how the introduction of weather derivatives affect
x
a government stakeholder: the National Weather Service. More broadly, the essay
examines the ability of markets to discipline government agencies. The Chicago Mer-
cantile Exchange has introduced several temperature related derivative contracts on
different U.S. cities in a staggered fashion since 1999. The payoffs of these contracts
depend on the temperature levels at a specific weather station in the underlying city.
We show that the introduction of these contracts improves the accuracy of tempera-
ture measurement by the dedicated weather station of the National Weather Services
(NWS) in that city. We argue that temperature-based financial markets generate
additional scrutiny of the temperature data measured by the NWS, which in turn
motivates the agency to minimize measurement errors. Consistent with this idea,
stations with higher economic interests in weather derivatives see greater improve-
ment in measurement accuracy. Our results indicate that the visibility and scrutiny
generated by financial markets can improve the efficiency of government agencies even
in the absence of explicit incentive contracts.
xi
CHAPTER I
Financial Sector Stress and Asset Prices: Evidence
from the Weather Derivatives Market
1.1 Abstract
I examine the impact of financial sector stress on asset prices in a novel setting:
the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s weather derivatives market. The structure of the
market allows me to disentangle price movements due to financial sector stress from
price movements due to fundamentals. Estimated weather risk premiums, which are
small and statistically indistinguishable from zero on average, rise to over 30% per
year during the 2008-09 financial crisis. Contracts with greater margin requirements
and idiosyncratic risk experience larger increases in risk premiums. These results
support the notion that adverse shocks to the capital of financial institutions lead to
increased hedging costs for end users and less risk-sharing in the economy.
1.2 Introduction
A recent theoretical literature argues that adverse shocks to financial sector capital
can affect asset prices. After an adverse capital shock, asset prices may fall below their
fundamental values if the positions of financial institutions are limited by their capital
1
constraints.1 However, it is difficult to measure the effect of financial sector stress on
asset prices in most market settings. The difficulty arises because asset fundamentals
are likely to change during periods of financial sector stress, which can lead to biased
estimates of the effect of stress. In this paper, I estimate the causal effect of financial
sector stress on asset prices by exploiting a novel setting in which fundamental values
are unlikely to be systematically mis-estimated. Specifically, I examine the impact of
financial sector stress on risk premiums in the Chicago Mercantile Exchange’s (CME)
monthly temperature futures market.
The monthly temperature futures market allows end users to hedge monthly tem-
perature risks. Energy and utility companies are the predominant end users. The
typical trade is for utilities to sell the local temperature future to minimize their
exposure to mild temperature outcomes and, thus, low energy sales. Financial insti-
tutions satisfy this asymmetric hedging demand by going long the futures contract
and bearing this mild temperature risk. Financial sector stress likely affects the will-
ingness and ability of financial institutions to bear risk in this market, but it should
not affect the weather. To measure the effect of financial sector stress on asset prices,
I compare expected returns of going long temperature futures (i.e, risk premiums)
during a period of financial sector stress (the 2008-09 financial crisis) to expected
returns in normal times. This test properly identifies the causal effect of financial
sector stress on asset prices because any error in measuring the fundamental value of
the futures contract is uncorrelated with the financial sector stress period.
Four qualities of temperature futures ensure that asset fundamentals (payoffs and
risks) are not systematically mis-estimated during the financial stress period. First,
contract payoffs are based on local temperature outcomes, which are exogenous to
1See Aiyagari and Gertler (1999), Gromb and Vayanos (2002), Fostel and Geanokoplos (2008),
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Adrian and Shin (2010) and Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) for
models on how asset prices may be sensitive to margin and debt constraints. He and Krishnamurthy
(2012,2013) examine the effect of equity constraints on asset prices and find that asset prices will
depend on the aggregate wealth of the financial sector. For a review of the literature, see Duffie
(2010).
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financial sector stress. Thus, the adverse shock to the financial sector does not affect
the distribution of contracts’ payoffs. Second, contract payoffs are largely idiosyn-
cratic. This rules out the possibility that changes in the price of systematic risk
are driving the change in risk premiums. Third, changes in expected payoffs due
to random temperature variation can be controlled for by modeling and estimating
a temperature process for each contract. Fourth, there is no counterparty risk be-
cause trades clear on an exchange. These four features allow me to clearly identify
the causal effect of financial sector stress on asset prices in a manner that no other
empirical setting allows.
Contracts in the monthly temperature futures market vary by location, month and
temperature index. In Figure A.1, I plot the logarithm of contract prices for contracts
on three different locations which settle based on June temperature realizations. For
each location, I plot the average price (32 days before maturity) and the average
payoff at maturity over the years 2000-2012. I also plot the price (32 days before
maturity) during the crisis period. The average price and payoff of each contract are
nearly identical, consistent with the contracts being priced near their actuarially fair
value. In contrast, the price during the crisis is far below the average price and payoff
of each contract. This figure illustrates the relatively low prices on weather derivative
contracts during the crisis.
[Figure A.1 Here]
Figure A.1 does not control for market expectations of contract payoffs. In the
main empirical tests, I control for market temperature expectations by modeling
a daily temperature process for each location and calculating a model simulated
expected payoff. With the expected payoff and market price, I calculate the expected
return from going long the futures contract, i.e. the weather risk premium.
To formally test for the effect of financial sector stress on risk premiums, I com-
pare the risk premium for a contract pre- and post-crisis to the risk premium for the
3
same contract during the 2008-09 financial crisis. The average risk premium across
all contracts over the entire period is less than 2% per year and is statistically in-
significant. This is consistent with idiosyncratic risk not being priced during normal
times. During the financial crisis, estimated average risk premiums rise to a statis-
tically significant 30% per year. In sum, contracts are typically priced near their
actuarially fair value, but during the crisis, contract prices are consistently below this
value. This is consistent with financial institutions decreasing their supply of capital
to the weather derivatives market during a period of financial sector stress.
Documenting the effect of financial sector stress on asset prices is important for
understanding the risks that hedgers and investors face, the way those risks are priced,
and how risks are shared in the economy. Pe´rez-Gonza´lez and Yun (2013) find that
after the introduction of weather derivative contracts, firms most exposed to tem-
perature risks were more likely to use weather derivatives, experience an increase in
firm value, invest more, and increase their leverage. If risk premiums rise because of
financial sector stress, the costs to use these contracts and to obtain these benefits
increase. As a result, there will be less risk-sharing than in a perfect market. Further
if the effect of financial sector stress documented in this market is present in other
markets, financial crises may cause large dislocations in prices and significantly lower
amounts of risk-sharing in the economy.
There are two main reasons why financial institutions may decrease their supply of
capital to the weather derivatives market after an adverse shock to their capital. First,
capital is necessary to meet margin requirements in the market. Without sufficient
capital, financial institutions will be unable to meet these requirements. Modeling
a market equilibrium with constrained traders, Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
show that higher margin contracts experience a greater decline in market liquidity,
defined as the difference between market and fundamental values, after an adverse
capital shock. Second, monthly temperature futures have significant amounts of total
4
risk that financial institutions may be unwilling to take on during a period of stress.
When financial institutions’ capital levels are low, increasing the risk on their balance
sheet will significantly increase the probability they will have to raise costly new
capital in the future.2 To limit their risk exposure, financial institutions will supply
less capital to markets with more total risk (Froot and Stein 1998).
Motivated by these theories, I examine the differential impact of stress on higher
margin contracts and contracts with more total risk. By early 2008, the CME
had introduced temperature contracts on 18 U.S. locations geographically dispersed
throughout the United States, on 12 different months and 2 different indices. Each
location-month-index has a different amount of total underlying risk (coefficient of
variation of contract payoffs) and the CME has location-index specific margin require-
ments. I run difference-in-difference regressions, where the financial crisis dummy
variable is interacted with the contract’s margin requirement or total risk or both. I
find a one standard deviation increase in margin increases risk premiums by about
76% per year in the financial crisis. Of similar magnitude, I find a one standard
deviation increase in total risk increases risk premiums by about 80% per year. In
addition, contracts with both high margin and high coefficient of variation are the
most impacted by financial sector stress. This evidence supports the notion that ad-
verse capital shocks to financial institutions have a significant effect on asset prices,
especially on prices of high-margin and high-risk contracts.
An increase in risk premiums alone does not imply that the supply of financial
capital to the weather derivatives market decreased during the financial crisis. Risk
premiums may also increase if hedging demand increases and the supply of capital
2There are many reasons why financial institutions in the weather derivatives market may be
capital constrained. Financial institutions could suffer from an asymmetric information problem
(Myers and Majluf 1984; Stein 1998), debt-overhang (Myers 1977) or a moral hazard problem
(Holmstrom and Tirole 1997). In addition, the costs of searching for capital are likely to be high
considering most individual investors and financial professionals are unfamiliar with the market and,
as a recent financial innovation, may have appeared unsafe to investors flying to safety during the
crisis (Caballero and Krishnamurthy 2008; Gennaioli, Shleifer and Vishny 2012).
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is not perfectly elastic in the short-run.3 If hedging demand is driving the increase
in risk premiums, we would expect greater quantities of risk to be hedged during the
crisis. This is not the case. The notional value of the entire weather derivatives mar-
ket decreased by over 50% from $32 billion to $15 billion during the crisis. Similarly,
open interest in the monthly futures market fell by 40% between the third and fourth
quarter of 2008. In describing the collapse of the market, the Weather Risk Manage-
ment Association President, Martin Malinow, said “It’s just mirroring what’s going
on in the greater financial markets. We are surviving from the same pool of capital.
We’ve had a financial storm over the past year that’s destroyed trillions of dollars of
capital.”4 Further supporting a decrease in capital supply, I find that markets for
high-margin contracts and riskier contracts were significantly more likely to collapse,
i.e. have zero open interest, during the crisis. The dramatic decline in notional value
and open interest rules out the alternative that an increase in hedging demand is
driving the increase in risk premiums.5
The existing literature has documented the effects of adverse capital shocks on
market outcomes in the commodities, currency exchange, convertible bond, lending
and other markets.6 Additionally, Adrian, Etula and Muir (2013) find that a factor
based on the leverage of financial intermediaries can explain a large portion of the
3Keynes (1930) and Hicks (1939) first proposed this argument to explain risk premiums in the
commodities market. Garleanu, Pedersen and Poteshman (2009) document a demand effect in the
options market, by showing that option prices increase as constrained market makers respond to
positive demand shocks.
4“Survey: Weather Risk Market Value Plunges 53%” Claims Journal, June 2009 http://www.
claimsjournal.com/news/national/2009/06/03/101075.htm
5Another alternative is that hedging demand declined. If this is the case, we would expect risk
premiums to be unchanged or fall during the crisis, not increase.
6Cheng, Kirilenko and Xiong (2013) find that an increase in the VIX index leads to lower
commodity prices and a “convective” flow of risk from financial institutions to hedgers. Examining
the currency markets, Brunnermeier, Nagel and Pedersen (2008) show that the funding constraints
of speculators can lead to currency crash risk and this can help explain the “forward risk premium
puzzle.” Chava and Purnanandam (2011), Paravisini (2008), Paravisini et al. (2011) and Iyer et
al. (2013) find evidence that adverse shocks to bank capital affect lending and other real outcomes.
Mitchell, Pedersen and Pulvino (2007) find price effects of slow moving capital in the convertible
bond market and merger spreads. Mitchell and Pulvino (2011) find substantial price differences in
similar assets during the 2008 financial crisis.
6
variation in the cross-section of expected returns. I extend these results by providing
clean evidence of the large impact that capital constraints can have on asset prices
and that idiosyncratic risk and margin requirements are priced during periods of fi-
nancial sector stress. The most closely related empirical evidence is on the increase in
catastrophe insurance risk premiums after adverse shocks to insurers and reinsurers
capital (Froot and O’Connell 1999).7 The effect of financial sector stress on prices in
the weather derivatives market is similar, but the markets differ from each other in
three important ways. First, the main players in the catastrophe insurance market are
reinsurers and insurers, while hedge funds, investment banks, energy trading desks,
commodity traders, and monoline weather traders all participate in the CME weather
derivatives market. Second, the contracts examined in this paper are exchange traded
on the CME, so the market should be relatively more competitive and liquid than the
catastrophe insurance market as the barriers to entry are lower and intermediaries
provide more depth. Third, estimating risk premiums in the catastrophe insurance
market is more difficult than in the temperature futures markets. Catastrophes are
less predictable than temperature outcomes, which makes controlling for fundamen-
tals a difficult task. Beyond examining a market with different characteristics, the
results in this paper differ from the catastrophe insurance literature by providing ev-
idence of price spillovers across markets and the differential impact of financial sector
stress on more “capital-intensive” and riskier contracts.
Overall, the results in this paper show that financial sector stress can have a large
impact on the prices of financial assets. If the effects documented in the weather
derivatives market are similar in other markets, the impact of financial crises on risk-
sharing and capital flows in the economy are substantial. Hedgers and other insurance
purchasers may be exposed to dramatically more risk during financial crises than in
a world with perfect markets.
7Also, see Zanjani (2002) and Born and Viscusi (2006)
7
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.3 describes the weather deriva-
tives market, the main players and the main hedging strategy by energy companies.
Section 2.4 discusses the data. Section 2.5 presents the research design and empirical
results. Section 2.6 concludes.
1.3 Weather Derivatives Market and Hedging Tactics
Almost all business is subject to weather risks. Dutton (2002) estimates that over
$3 trillion of the U.S. GDP is associated with weather-sensitive industries. Although
the importance of weather in affecting business outcomes has been understood for
millenniums, the first modern-day weather derivative contract was written in 1996.
The contract obligated Aquila Energy to sell ConEdison Company electric power at
a discount if August temperatures were cooler than expected (Everitt and Melnick
2008). This simple financial innovation, contracting based on temperature realiza-
tions, was well received by the energy sector. The market for contracts based on
temperature and other non-catastrophic weather outcomes, such as frost, snowfall
and rainfall, grew dramatically from a notional value below $2 billion in 1998 to $32
billion in 2008 (WRMA surveys).
In 1999, the CME introduced standardized monthly temperature contracts on
10 locations in the United States. Exchange-traded contracts were not immediately
popular. The market grew in the over-the counter market, where Enron was a main
player and market maker. When Enron collapsed in 2001, end users and financial
intermediaries became more aware of counterparty risk in the over-the-counter market
and shifted trading to the CME. The CME has periodically added contracts on 14 new
locations throughout the United States and expanded into Canada, Europe, Japan
and Australia. Contracts are based on temperature outcomes over seasonal, monthly
or weekly time periods and multiple temperature indices. As of 2012, there were 47
locations around the world with temperature-based weather contracts traded on the
8
CME.
I focus on the U.S. monthly degree day futures in this paper. In 2005, temperature
contracts accounted for over 95% of the entire market and 50% of the temperature
contracts were monthly degree day futures (Weather Risk Management Association
Survey 2006). Contracts on U.S. locations have been introduced in 5 waves: 1999,
2000, 2003, 2005 and 2008. In Table A.1, I document the 18 U.S. locations with
temperature-based weather derivatives traded on the CME pre-2008.8 Purnanandam
and Weagley (2013) show that the introduction of contracts is correlated with proxies
for hedging demand, such as a city’s population (energy usage) and the region’s crop
production. Open interest and notional value in the monthly temperature market
closely mirrored the growth in the entire weather derivatives market during the 1999
to 2008 period.
[Table A.1 Here]
Although the CME temperature futures market has seen tremendous growth it
is relatively illiquid. Bid-ask spreads are large and many deals are conducted off
exchange and submitted as block trades. Markets typically open in the 3 weeks
before the contract month, the median market is opened 39 days before maturity,
and participants rarely change their positions. After a market is initially opened,
open interest does not change on 85% of trading days.9 Open interest decreases on
less than 5% of trading days. The market’s illiquidity is likely to amplify financial
institutions’ unwillingness to take risk and lead to larger price distortions during stress
as predicted by Garleanu and Pedersen (2007).10
8The 6 locations added in 2008 were Colorado Springs, Jacksonville, Little Rock, Los Angeles,
Raleigh Durham and Washington D.C.
9Calculated over the years 2006-2012 for the monthly temperature futures market
10Although the market is illiquid, it appears to be relatively efficient. Similar to Roll (1984),
Chincarini (2011) finds that prices in the temperature market can improve temperature predictions
beyond National Weather Service forecasts.
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1.3.1 Contract Structure
The payoffs of the standard temperature derivative contracts traded on the CME
are based on either the heating degree day (HDD) index or the cooling degree day
(CDD) index for a specific location and time duration. The monthly indices are
calculated as follows:
HDDim =
Tm∑
t=1
max{65− Tempit, 0}, (1.1)
CDDim =
Tm∑
t=1
max{Tempit − 65, 0}, (1.2)
where HDDim (CDDim) is the HDD (CDD) index for location i and month m, Tm is
the number of days in month m, and Tempit is the average temperature of location
i on day t. The average temperature is the arithmetic mean of the maximum and
minimum temperatures recorded during the day. The contract payoffs are $20 ∗
HDDim and $20∗CDDim. The indices received their names due to their relationship
with energy usage. When the heating degree day (cooling degree day) index is high,
temperatures are cold (hot) and consumers need more energy to heat (cool) their
homes and buildings.
1.3.2 Main Players and Their Hedging Tactics
In this section, I will argue that the net hedging position of end users is short
in the monthly futures market due to the large presence of energy companies and
their desire to hedge against mild temperatures. This asymmetry in hedging demand
is necessary for a shift in hedging demand or capital supply to affect the price and
quantity of contracts, and allows me to calculate a risk premium charged by financial
institutions.
In 2004-05, the Weather Risk Management Association documented that 69% of
10
over-the-counter weather derivative end users were energy companies. This number
has hovered around 50% over time and is likely greater on the CME, where energy
companies helped structure the market.11 For energy suppliers, there are opposing
cost and volume risks associated with temperature outcomes. Energy sales usually
fall if temperatures are mild because firms and households use less natural gas or elec-
tricity to heat or cool their building. Concomitantly, input costs usually rise during
a period of extreme temperatures when demand for energy is high and the supply of
inputs is relatively fixed. The exposure of utilities to cost fluctuations can be par-
tially diminished by passing through changes in costs to consumers (Perez-Gonzales
and Yun 2013). Every state in the United States, has purchased gas adjustments
(PGA) for natural gas utilities (American Gas Association, 2007). The PGA adjust
rates based on the price of natural gas, which helps mitigate utilities’ exposure to
fluctuations in the price of natural gas.
Although the costs due to a temporary spike in temperatures are more salient
for customers, e.g. summer blackouts or high natural gas prices, the costs to energy
suppliers and distributors of long term mild temperatures can be quite large. For
example, in justifying the decline in DTE Energy’s earnings from $147M in the second
quarter of 2012 to $109M in the second quarter of 2013, executive vice president David
Meador explained “while last years second quarter operating earnings were boosted
by record-setting (extreme) temperatures, we are on track to realize our financial
and operational goals for this year.”12 Perez-Gonzales and Yun (2013) find that
energy firms most exposed to mild temperature risks have valuations approximately
4% lower than other energy firms and have lower revenues, return on assets and
operating income.
11The year-by-year OTC percentage of end user demand attributed to the energy sector was:
56% in 2003-04, 69% in 2004-05, 46% in 2005-06, 47% in 2006-07, 36% in 2007-08, 59% in 2008-09,
58% in 2009-10 and 46% in 2010-11
12“DTE Energy Earnings Fall Due To Cooler Weather” CBS Detroit, July 2013 http://detroit.
cbslocal.com/2013/07/28/dte-energy-earnings-fall-due-to-cooler-weather/
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The monthly temperature futures examined are better suited to hedge the quantity
risk associated with mild temperatures than the spike in input costs due to a few hours
or days of extreme temperatures for multiple reasons. First, energy companies can
hedge the cost of inputs through traditional futures or by switching between energy
sources, if possible, and use monthly temperature futures to hedge low sales. Second,
risks of a spike in input prices due to a few days of extreme temperature are better
hedged using other, shorter-duration contracts, such as critical day options or daily
weather contingent power options, not a contract on the monthly aggregate of daily
temperature deviations. Third, call options on monthly or seasonal degree days can
be purchased on the CME, which pay out when temperatures are extreme over the
month or season, respectively. These option contracts will better capture extreme
temperature events that will lead to a shortage in natural gas supply.
Not all utilities will find it beneficial to use weather derivatives to hedge volume
risks. The sensitivity of revenue to temperature and the fluctuations in temperature
will vary across locations and utilities. In addition, the utility’s regulatory body may
allow for rate changes based on volume fluctuations either through full or partial
decoupling of revenues and sales volume or a flat fee structure. Decoupling mecha-
nisms were introduced to incentivize energy utilities to promote energy efficiency and
to share volume risks between customers and shareholders. Full decoupling adjusts
rates to keep revenue per customer relatively constant over time. Partial decoupling,
or weather normalization adjustments (WNA), adjust rates in response to weather-
driven changes in revenue, effectively shifting temperature risk to customers. There
are also flat free programs, where customers pay a flat monthly fee for their energy.13
In 2009, natural gas utilities in 36 states had non-volumetric rate designs. Electric
utilities in only 9 states had decoupling mechanisms.14 Not all utilities have these
13http://www.aga.org/SiteCollectionDocuments/RatesReg/Issues/Revenue%
20Decoupling%20and%20other%20Non-Volumetric%20Rate%20Designs/2009%20Aug%
20Accounting%20Presentation.pdf
14http://switchboard.nrdc.org/blogs/rcavanagh/decouplingreportMorganfinal.pdf
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adjustments. Utilities with these adjustments may still be exposed to volume risks
either because the rate adjustment is not contemporaneous with the weather shock,
revenues are only adjusted for non-weather related revenue changes, there is regula-
tory risk or the adjustment is only for the regulated portion of the utility’s business
(see Perez-Gonzales and Yun (2013) for a more complete discussion). Even with the
prevalence of regulatory mechanisms, Perez-Gonzales and Yun (2013) find that one-
quarter of utilities use weather derivatives and the CME reports that 35% of energy
companies used weather derivative instruments in 2008.
An example of a utility using weather derivatives to hedge against low revenue
due to mild temperature is Washington Gas Light Company, a natural gas distributor
in the Washington DC area. In its 2012 10-K filing, Washington Gas describes its
weather derivative usage as such:
During the fiscal years ended September 30, 2012, 2011 and 2010, Wash-
ington Gas used HDD weather-related instruments to manage its financial
exposure to variations from normal weather in the District of Columbia.
Under these contracts, Washington Gas purchased protection against net
revenue shortfalls due to warmer-than-normal weather and sold to its
counterparty the right to receive the benefit when weather is colder than
normal.
Washington Gas’ position in the weather derivatives market is a prime example
of a utility hedging mild temperature risks with weather derivatives. Consistent
with weather derivatives being used by utilities to hedge mild temperatures, Perez-
Gonzales and Yun (2013) find that energy companies that were especially sensitive to
mild temperature outcomes were 2 to 3 times more likely to use weather derivatives
after their introduction than less exposed energy companies.
To hedge low revenues due to mild temperatures, energy companies will sell
monthly futures. This position will have a positive return if temperatures are suf-
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ficiently mild. If energy companies are the main end users in the market and their
desire to hedge leads them to sell the monthly contract, then there will be a net
short hedging position on average. This asymmetry creates an active role for finan-
cial institutions to bear risk in the market, where a direct exchange between hedgers
is uncommon (Perez-Gonzales and Yun 2013, Brix and Jewson 2005). The Weather
Risk Management Association documents that hedge funds, investment banks, in-
surance/reinsurance companies, monoline weather trading desks and energy trading
desks all play an active role in the exchange market. On net, these financial inter-
mediaries should be long the monthly temperature futures. Consistent with financial
institutions being net long, Bellini (2005) estimates a positive risk premium in both
HDD and CDD contracts for three U.S. locations over January 2002 to February
2004. Similarly, I find a positive, but insignificant average risk premium in my sam-
ple. I maintain the assumption that financial institutions are net long in the market
throughout my analysis.
1.4 Data Description
End-of-day price, open interest and margin data for the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change monthly temperature futures was provided by the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change. To eliminate concerns about cross-country differences, I only analyze con-
tracts on U.S. locations. Due to a lack of trading pre-crisis, I eliminate the 6 U.S.
locations that were introduced in 2008, leaving 18 U.S. locations. The sample covers
monthly contracts from the first month traded, October 1999, to February 2012. The
temperature data was obtained from MDA Information Systems, Inc. MDA is the
provider of official temperatures used to settle CME temperature contracts.
In Figure A.4, I plot the average price and open interest of February HDD con-
tracts by location. HDD contracts capture deviations in temperature below 65oF.
Prices and open interest in the weather derivatives market vary as would be expected.
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Prices are higher in locations with more extreme temperature, e.g. Minneapolis, and
open interest is higher in locations with more economic interest, e.g. New York.
[Figure A.4 Here]
In the first panel of Table A.2, I present summary statistics for contract open
interest. Contracts are defined along location, index, month and year dimensions.
The sample is limited to the 1,104 contracts that were open at least 32 days before
maturity. Open interest is the maximum open interest achieved at least 32 days before
maturity. The mean open interest over the entire period is 236 per contract. There is
a lot of variation in open interest with a 10th percentile of 12 and a 90th percentile of
550.15 There is slightly more open interest per contract in CDD contracts than HDD
contracts, but fewer contracts traded.
[Table A.2 Here]
A sample of 1,104 contracts is relatively small considering there would be 432
contracts traded each year if every available contract were traded. In 2008, the number
of contracts traded peaked at 154 contracts. There are a few reasons why the actual
number of contracts traded is below the number of available contracts. First, weather
risks are seasonal, so there is rarely an HDD and CDD contract traded on the same
location in the same month. HDD contracts are mainly traded in the winter months,
while CDD contracts are mainly traded in the summer months. Second, there is little
activity in the months of April and October. These are considered transition months
in the weather derivatives market because temperatures are relatively mild. Third,
different locations face different risks. For example, locations with warmer climates
are less likely to have significant hedging demand in HDD contract markets. Fourth,
15The open interest 32 days before maturity is typically about one-half of the maximum open
interest achieved during the trading period. Summary statistics for the maximum open interest
achieved during the trading period are: mean=455, standard deviation=734, 10th percentile=20,
50th percentile=200, 90th percentile=1,150 and 1,661 contracts traded.
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the level of economic interest tied to temperature risks can vary across locations
even if the climates are identical. Fifth, I examine contracts that were trading 32
days before maturity, while some markets might first experience trading closer to
maturity. These reasons limit the number of contracts that trade each month.
In Table A.3, I summarize speculator maintenance margin requirements and the
historical coefficient of variation of the contract index (for location specific margin
requirements see Table A.1.). These are the main independent variables of interest in
the difference-in-difference regressions. The maintenance margin requirements vary
from 3.1% to 17%. Margin requirements are greater for CDD contracts on average.
The mean maintenance margin requirement for HDD contracts is 5.4% and for CDD
contracts is 7.7%. Margin requirements are likely lower for HDD contracts because
margins are set based on price volatility and HDD contracts are less volatile than
CDD contracts. The mean coefficient of variation for CDD contracts is 0.28 and for
HDD contracts is 0.22. The distribution of total risk is right skewed. The mean
coefficient of variation is 0.25 and the median is 0.21. Values range from .08 to 1.03,
with a standard deviation of 0.13. Although margins are set based on price volatility,
the correlation between margin and coefficient of variation is only 0.55. The relatively
low correlation is due to margins being set at the location-index level, while coefficient
of variation is calculated at the location-index-month level. Also, margins are set at
round numbers and are unlikely to be a perfect linear function of contract risk.
[Table A.3 Here]
1.4.1 Estimating Risk Premiums
The risk premium for each contract is calculated as follows: E[Payoff ]
Price
− (1 + rf ),
where rf is the monthly risk-free rate, Price is the price 32 days from contract
maturity and E[Payoff ] is the expected payoff based on information 32 days from
maturity. The maturity date is the last day of the contract’s specified month. 32 days
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was chosen as a trade-off between the number of contracts traded in the market and
the amount of temperature information (realized or forecasted temperatures) embed-
ded in prices. This also allows for a discussion of the risk premium as approximately
a monthly risk premium.
To estimate the expected payoff I model the average daily temperature process for
each location as a discrete-time AR(1) process following Bellini (2005) and Dornier
and Querel (2000). The model captures seasonality in the mean and standard de-
viation of daily temperatures. I use maximum likelihood estimation to estimate the
parameters for each location separately. I estimate the model using temperature re-
alizations from January 1, 1999 to January 31, 2012. In Appendix A, I detail the
temperature process, the likelihood estimation and give the parameter estimates for
each location. The parameter estimates align with the behavior of temperature in
each location. In Figure A.3, I plot the average temperature versus the estimated
mean temperature by day of the year for the 4 largest cities by population in my
sample. In blue, I plot the average temperature for each day of the year calculated
over the years 1999-2012. In green, I plot the estimated mean temperature. The
model estimates appear to capture the mean temperature dynamics fairly well.
[Figure A.3 Here]
After the temperature process has been estimated, I calculate expected payoffs by
using the temperature realization 32 days before contract maturity and simulating 500
temperature paths over the next 32 days until contract maturity. From the simulated
temperatures, I apply the HDD and CDD temperature formulas to calculate the payoff
of the contract for each path. The expected payoff is the average of the simulated
contract payoffs. Once I have obtained the expected payoff, I can calculate a weather
risk premium using the expected payoff, contract price, and the risk free rate.
In the second and third panels of Table A.2, I present summary statistics for
the weather risk premium and realized contract returns. Realized contract returns
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are calculated as follows: Payoff
Price
− (1 + rf ), where Payoff is the realized index
value, Price is the price 32 days before maturity and rf is the risk-free rate. The
risk premiums and realized returns are presented as percentages. Risk premiums
are winsorized at the 1% level to reduce the impact of outliers. I cut the sample
into CDD, HDD and all contracts. The mean weather risk premium for the entire
sample is 0.16% and is not significantly different from 0. The mean risk premium
for CDD contracts, 0.50, is higher than the mean risk premium for HDD contracts,
-0.10. Neither mean is significantly different from zero. The median risk premium
for the entire sample is -.79%. Examining the realized returns, the mean realized
return is -1.08% and is statistically insignificant. The mean realized return for HDD
contracts is -1.79% and for CDD contracts is -0.14%. The mean realized return
for HDD contracts is statistically different from zero at the 5% level. The negative
returns are concentrated in the low open interest (<300) contracts. High open interest
HDD contracts have a positive mean return. The relatively low risk premiums and
returns for heating degree day contracts could be due to the prevalence of regulatory
mechanisms to hedge temperature risk during the winter months for many utilities.
Most of the natural gas decoupling mechanisms are for the winter months and there
are very few states with weather adjustment clauses for electric utilities.
Why would financial institutions participate in the market if risk premiums are
near zero on average? Even if risk premiums are zero, financial institutions enjoy a
diversification benefit from investing in weather derivatives. Second, as will be dis-
cussed in Section 1.5.4, returns on weather derivatives appear to be slightly negatively
correlated with the market, so risk premiums should be zero or negative in a world
with perfect capital markets.
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1.5 Empirical Analysis
1.5.1 Research Design
My main hypothesis is that that a loss of financial sector capital and the inability
of financial institutions to immediately and costlessly raise new capital causes finan-
cial institutions to decrease their supply of capital to the weather derivatives market.
The decline in capital supply to the market will lead to higher risk premiums and lower
open interest. To test this hypothesis, the ideal empirical design would compare risk
premiums during periods of financial sector stress to the risk premiums that would
exist if the financial sector were not stressed. This counterfactual does not exist; in-
stead, I compare risk premiums during a period of financial sector stress, the 2008-09
financial crisis, to risk premiums pre- and post-crisis. The identifying assumption
is that the fundamental values of the contracts are not systematically misestimated
during the financial crisis period. This seems reasonable for three reasons: (1) the
temperature processes are relatively stationary over time and are unaffected by finan-
cial sector stress, thus, it is unlikely there is an unmodeled change in the distribution
of contract payoffs during the crisis, (2) contract risks are largely idiosyncratic, so
risk premiums should not vary with the price of systematic risk, and (3) there is no
counterparty risk since contracts clear on the exchange.
The following is the regression specification used in the main test:
WRPimdy = αimd + β · FinancialCrisisym + imdy, (1.3)
where FinancialCrisisym is an indicator variable equal to 1 during the financial crisis
period and is based on the contract year y and month m, αimd is the contract fixed
effect for the contract on location i, month m and index d. I control for contract
fixed effects because risk premiums are likely to vary across contracts with different
risk profiles, margin requirements, hedging demand and possibly other sources of het-
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erogeneity. This test analyzes the annual variation in risk premiums for the same
contract defined along the location, index and month dimensions. For example, the
risk premium for the 2009 New York February HDD contract will be compared to
the risk premiums for the New York February HDD contract in the years 2000-2008
and 2010-2012. β provides the coefficient estimate of interest. The main hypothesis
predicts β > 0, i.e. risk premiums increase during the financial crisis. The financial
crisis period is defined as the months including and between October 2008 and De-
cember 2009. The failure of Lehman Brothers in mid-September 2008 precipitated
a systemic crisis in the global financial system (Brunnermeier 2009). October 2008
contracts should be the first impacted by Lehman’s failure because risk premiums are
based on prices measured 32 days before maturity. December 2009 is chosen as the
ending date to capture the entire period of crisis. The VIX spiked in September 2008
and did not return to its pre-crisis level until late 2009. The S&P 500 plummeted
around the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, reached its nadir in March 2009 and slowly
grew throughout 2009. An end date of December 2009 should capture the majority
of the crisis.
After controlling for contract fixed effects, any variation in estimated risk premi-
ums should be due to movements in market expectations of forecasted temperatures,
changes in the market structure or shifts in the contract supply and demand curves.
The identifying assumption in the main test is that the remaining variation in risk
premiums due to changes in forecasted temperatures or market structure is uncorre-
lated with the financial crisis time period. The validity of this assumption is critical to
the interpretation of my results, so I will briefly discuss each of the potential sources
of bias.
I observe an increase in risk premiums during the financial crisis, therefore, prices
relative to expected payoffs must have dropped. For this to be explained by a bias in
temperature forecasts, forecasted temperatures must have been systematically more
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mild during the financial crisis leading to lower forecasted index levels and lower
prices. This does not seem to be the case. In Figure A.4, I provide five maps of
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s three-month temperature fore-
casts during the financial crisis period. The maps are shaded based on the chances of
temperatures being above or below normal. During this 15 month period, forecasted
temperatures appear to be barely warmer than normal on average, not more mild.
Even if there is a bias in forecasted temperatures, this will be partially adjusted for
by the temperature process model, which uses realized temperatures to model future
temperatures each month throughout the crisis. Additionally, in Appendix B, I ana-
lyze realized temperatures during the crisis and find that realized temperatures were
significantly more extreme in the HDD months and insignificantly cooler in the CDD
months. This is inconsistent with unusually mild temperature forecasts driving the
results. Lastly, when realized temperatures are included as controls in the empirical
tests there is no change in the statistical or economic significance of the estimates.
[Figure A.4 Here]
There are two main concerns about how the structure of the weather derivatives
market may have changed during the financial crisis period. The first concern is
that the fees the CME charged may have increased during the financial crisis time
period. I only know the fees present in the market on September 13, 2013. The fee to
trade weather products is under $0.20, or about one fifty-thousandth of the average
contract price. It is unlikely that any fee increase would have caused a significant
increase in risk premiums. The second concern is that margin requirements may have
changed over time and this is biasing my results. The CME held margins constant
for all contracts in my sample from January 2008 to early 2010. The CME chooses
margin levels to cover approximately 99% of price moves during a trading day. The
volatility of the underlying temperature likely did not change during the crisis, so it
is not surprising that margins did not change.
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To further analyze the role of adverse capital shocks in affecting asset prices, I
conduct difference-in-difference tests examining the differential impact of financial
sector stress on contracts with different margin requirements and total risk. I will
present the empirical strategy with the contract’s margin requirement as the cross-
sectional variable of interest, but the same method is used in the total risk regressions.
The regression is specified:
WRPimdy = αimd+β ·FinancialCrisisym+γ ·FinancialCrisisym ·Marginimd+imdy,
(1.4)
where Marginimd is the margin requirement for the contract on location i, month
m and index d. I do not include the Marginimd variable as an additional regressor
because each contract’s margin is captured in the contract fixed effect. The financial
crisis dummy controls for the average change in risk premiums due to financial sector
stress and any fixed time effect in the mis-measurement of expected payoffs. γ will
capture the differential change in risk premiums of high versus low margin contracts
during the financial crisis. Only if the mis-measurement of expected payoffs was
systematically different for high-margin contracts during the financial crisis would
the regression be misidentified. If capital constraints are driving the increase in risk
premiums, then γ should be greater than 0, as financial institutions should be less
willing to take more “capital-intensive” positions during a period of stress.
1.5.2 Risk Premium Results
I estimate the impact of financial sector stress on risk premiums in the weather
derivatives market by estimating Equation 1.3. Results of the main test are reported
in Table A.4. The coefficient of interest is the indicator variable for the period of
financial sector stress (Financial Crisis). In Column 1, I include all contracts. In
Columns 2 and 3, the sample is limited to CDD and HDD contracts, respectively. I
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cluster standard errors at the year-month level in all regressions.16 The coefficient
estimates vary from 1.62 for HDD contracts to 7.97 for CDD contracts, with a coef-
ficient of 3.34 for all contracts. An average increase in risk premiums of 3.34% per
month, or 40.08% per year, during the financial crisis is economically quite large. The
increased risk premium is about 7% of the average contract notional value (two times
the historical standard deviation of the monthly degree day index) and more than
half of the average margin requirement. The notional value of the CME temperature
market in 2009 was $14.5 billion. If the effect in other temperature markets was sim-
ilar to the effect in the monthly futures market, the direct increase in hedging costs
would have been $900 million or more. This estimate does not consider the indirect
costs due to the lower quantity of risk being shared in the market.
[Table A.4 Here]
It should be emphasized that both HDD and CDD contracts experienced an in-
crease in risk premiums. This decreases the probability that warmer temperature
forecasts are driving the results. If the market forecasted temperatures to be warmer
than the model-predicted temperatures during the crisis period, then the financial
crisis coefficient should only be significant for HDD contracts since warmer temper-
atures result in a mild winter, lower prices and a higher risk premium. Instead, the
16The main independent variable, FinancialCrisisym, is both serially and cross-sectionally cor-
related. If the regression error terms are serially or cross-sectionally correlated (or both), then
OLS standard errors will be biased. The dependent variable, WRPimdy, is likely correlated within
months, as temperature fluctuations are, at a minimum, regionally correlated. To address this issue,
I cluster the standard errors at the year-month level. Clustering at the year-month level will also
address heteroskedasticity in risk premiums across months. It is also likely that risk premiums are
correlated within contracts at the location, index & month level. The margin requirement, idiosyn-
cratic volatility, systematic risk and hedging demand will vary across contracts and may affect the
risk premium charged. To control for the time invariant difference in risk premiums across contracts,
I include contract fixed effects in all regressions. Fixed effects seem more reasonable than imprecisely
controlling for the effect of idiosyncratic volatility, systematic risk and margins on risk premiums.
In unreported regressions, I also cluster standard errors at the contract level as hedging demand or
other omitted variables may be serially correlated, but temporary. Clustering at the contract level
does not meaningfully change the standard error estimates once contract fixed effects are included
and standard errors are clustered at the year-month level.
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results are even stronger for the CDD contracts. One possible reason the CDD con-
tracts experienced a greater increase in risk premiums is that CDD contracts have
larger margin requirements and more total risk in the underlying.
Next, I examine the impact of financial sector stress on contracts with different
margin requirements. All else equal, if a financial institution faces costs to raising
new capital and experiences an adverse capital shock, it will require greater returns
on assets that are more capital intensive (Brunnermeier and Pedersen 2009). If an
adverse shock to financial sector capital is driving the increase in risk premiums,
we should see greater risk premiums in contracts with higher margin requirements.
To test for the impact of financial sector stress on contracts with different margin
requirements, I estimate Equation 1.4. I use the July 2008 maintenance margin
requirements for speculators as the margin measure. The initial margin requirements
are perfectly correlated with the maintenance margin requirements, so the results are
identical if initial margins are used.
The results are reported in Table A.5. The regression including all, CDD and
HDD contracts are presented in Columns 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Consistent with
financial sector stress differentially impacting markets with greater margin require-
ments, the coefficient estimates range from 2.19 for CDD contracts to 3.38 for HDD
contracts. The coefficient for all contracts is 2.66. The coefficient is significant at the
1% level for both the full sample and the HDD sub-sample and is significant at the
5% level for the CDD sub-sample. A coefficient of 2.66 corresponds to a 6.36% (76%)
increase in the monthly (yearly) risk premium with a one standard deviation increase
in margin requirements. For a Las Vegas HDD contract with a margin of 5.4%, the
full (HDD) sample regression coefficient implies an increase in the risk premium of
2.25% (2.21%) per month during the crisis. For the higher margin Chicago CDD
contract with a margin of 11%, the estimated increase in risk premium would be
17.15% per month using the full sample coefficient and 15.89% per month using the
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CDD sample coefficient. These results imply a very large market-wide shadow cost
of external capital. For this result to be explained by misestimation of risk premiums
during the financial crisis, the misestimation would have to be systematically biased
towards high-margin contracts. This bias would have to occur for both HDD and
CDD indices, which capture opposing temperature extremes. This is highly unlikely.
[Table A.5 Here]
To further document the price impact of adverse capital shocks, I examine the
differential impact of financial sector stress on contracts with different amounts of
total risk. Froot and Stein (1998) show that if a financial institution faces costly
external capital, its effective risk aversion will be decreasing in its internal capital. In
other words, after an adverse shock to the financial institution’s capital, it will become
effectively more risk averse. Because contract risks cannot be perfectly hedged, an
increase in the risk aversion of a financial institution will lead the financial institution
to decrease its supply of capital to riskier contracts after a loss in capital. Additionally,
if individual traders use value-at-risk metrics to determine their positions and their
value-at-risk constraint tightens during periods of financial sector stress, contracts
with greater total risk, all else equal, should experience a larger decline in capital
supply.
To test for the differential effect of stress on contracts with greater total risk, I
run difference-in-difference regressions with total risk as the cross-sectional variable
of interest. I proxy for total risk with the contract’s coefficient of variation, which
is calculated as follows: σindex
µindex
, where σindex and µindex are the standard deviation
and mean, respectively, of the degree day index for the specific location and month.
The mean and standard deviation are calculated over the years 1974 to 2011. The
coefficient of variation closely approximates the standard deviation of contract returns
over the life of the contract and is equivalent to the standard deviation of contract
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returns if the contract price is always equal to the historical mean.17
Results are presented in Table A.6. The coefficient of interest is the interac-
tion term for the contract’s coefficient of variation and the financial crisis indicator
variable, CV*Financial Crisis. Results for regressions including all, CDD and HDD
contracts are presented in Columns 1, 2 and 3, respectively. The coefficient estimates
range from 28.83 for CDD contracts to 63.37 for the HDD contracts and the coeffi-
cient for the full sample is 51.61. The coefficient is significant at the 1% level for both
the full sample and the HDD sub-sample. These results indicate that more volatile
contracts experienced relatively higher risk premiums in the financial crisis. Eco-
nomically, a one-standard deviation increase in a contract’s coefficient of variation is
associated with an increase in monthly (yearly) risk premiums of approximately 6.7%
(80%) during the financial crisis. For a Cincinnati April HDD contract, which has
the median coefficient of variation of 0.21, the coefficient estimates imply an increase
in monthly risk premiums of 4.45% (1.14%) during the crisis based off the full (HDD)
regression. For the higher risk New York May CDD contract with a coefficient of
variation of .62, the coefficient estimates imply an increase in monthly risk premi-
ums of 23.23% (18.12%) based off the full (CDD) regression. These results support
the notion that financial institutions become effectively more risk averse after capital
losses.
[Table A.6 Here]
Margin requirements are based off market conditions, mainly price volatility. If
margin requirements are just proxies for idiosyncratic risk, then the results presented
above may be redundant and it would be difficult to disentangle the increase in
risk premiums due to margin from the increase due to total risk. Beneficial for this
study, margins are not a linear function of total risk. The correlation between margin
17Further motivation for using the coefficient of variation comes from Hirshleifer (1988). He shows
that the risk premium on a commodity should be increasing in its coefficient of variation if there is
a fixed cost to participating in the market.
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requirements and coefficients of variation is 0.55. The two are not perfectly correlated
for two reasons: (1) margins are set at the location-index level, while contract risks are
at the contract level, and (2) margin requirements are clustered at certain numbers
(e.g. 4 and 7), even though risks are not identical across locations with the same
margin.
To determine whether margin and contract risk have unique effects, I run difference-
in-difference regressions including a three-way interaction between margin, total risk
and the crisis dummy. If both margin requirements and contract risk are drivers of
risk premiums during financial sector stress, there should be a positive and significant
coefficient on the three-way interaction.
Results are reported in Table A.7. Consistent with margin and total risk affecting
risk premiums, the coefficient on the triple interaction is positive in all regressions.
The coefficient is 8.10 and statistically significant at the 10% level for the regression
with all contracts. For the HDD contracts, the coefficient is 26.30 and is significant at
the 1% level. The coefficient is 4.51 and insignificant for the CDD sample. Examining
the regressions without the triple interaction term, both margin and contract risk
have positive coefficients. For the regression with all contracts, the effect of margin
is significant at the 5% level and the coefficient on contract risk is positive, but
insignificant. In sum, it appears that both margin levels and contract risk appear to
matter to stressed financial institutions.
[Table A.7 Here]
I have shown that margin requirements and total risk matter for asset prices during
a period of financial sector stress, but do they also matter during periods when the
financial sector is healthy? To answer this question, I run separate regressions of
contract risk premiums on contract characteristics over the entire period, in the crisis
period and in normal times. Regressions are of the form:
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WRPimdy = γ ∗Ximd + δm + imdy,
where the dependent variable is the weather risk premium for location i, month m,
degree day index d and year y, Ximd is either Marginimd or CVimd, and δm is a month
fixed effect. I do not include a contract specific fixed effect because the margin
requirement and coefficient of variation are fixed at the contract level.
Regression results are reported in Table A.8. Regressions with margin require-
ments (coefficient of variation) as the independent variable are reported in Columns
1-3 (4-6). The entire period regressions are labeled “Entire” and are reported in
Columns 1 and 4, the periods outside of the financial crisis are labeled “Normal”
and are reported in Columns 2 and 5, and the crisis period regressions are labeled
“Crisis” and are reported in Columns 3 and 6. Focusing on the impact of margin
requirements on risk premiums, we see that risk premiums are positively related to
margins over the entire sample period, but the coefficient is statistically insignificant
and small. The positive relationship between margins and premiums is due to the
crisis period. The normal period regression shows that margins are insignificantly
negatively related with risk premiums during periods of financial sector health with
a coefficient of -0.32. The coefficient during stress is positive and large at 2.23, and
is significant at the 1% level. We see a similar pattern in the total risk analysis. The
results suggest that total risk and margin only affect contract pricing during periods
of financial sector stress.
[Table A.8 Here]
1.5.3 Notional Value and Open Interest
The previous results show that risk premiums increase during a period of financial
sector stress and the effect is strongest for higher margin and riskier contracts. These
results are consistent with a shift in the supply curve of capital, but they are also
consistent with an increase in hedging demand. If hedging demand is driving the
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increase in risk premiums, then the open interest and the notional value of contracts
should have increased during the crisis. If a decrease in the supply of capital is driving
the rise in risk premiums, then these quantities should have decreased.
In Figure A.5, I plot total open interest in the monthly temperature futures market
by quarter. Open interest grew rapidly from introduction until the fourth quarter of
2008, then fell by nearly 40% with the start of the crisis. The decrease in open interest
is consistent with a decrease in the supply of financial institution capital, not solely
an increase in end user hedging demand during the crisis period. At the contract
level, of the 136 contracts (defined at the location, month and index) that traded
in the 12 months pre-crisis, 65 contracts experienced a decline in open interest of at
least 66% during the first 12 months after the Lehman failure. 36 contracts collapsed
completely (zero open interest) and only 33 experienced an increase in open interest.
Surprisingly, there were 46 contracts with zero open interest in the 12 months pre-
crisis that traded during the crisis period.18
[Figure A.5 Here]
The monthly temperature futures market did not fully recover after the crisis
during the sample period. The lack of renewed activity is likely due to participant
concerns about market liquidity after the crisis. Participants discussed the rapid
growth of the market pre-crisis as “liquidity breeding liquidity” in the market.19 After
the crisis, participants were likely hesitant to take positions, concerned others would
not participate in the market and create liquidity.
Another reason for the lack of renewed activity in the monthly temperature fu-
tures market is that some activity migrated to the OTC and seasonal futures market
after the crisis (WRMA Survey 2010). A concern is that activity just shifted across
18In the crisis, April and October both saw a dramatic increase in the number of contracts traded
(14 in each month). The cause of this increase is unclear. It could be due to investors hedging
seasonal contract positions after the onset of the crisis. Post-crisis there were very few contracts
traded in these months.
19
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markets and the quantity of risk shared did not change. This is not the case. The
notional value of the entire weather derivatives market decreased dramatically during
the financial crisis. The Weather Risk Management Association surveys market par-
ticipants and the Chicago Mercantile Exchange each April about weather derivative
activities over the previous calendar year. WRMA computes a market-wide notional
value across all weather derivative contracts, both OTC and exchange-traded. The
April 2007 to March 2008 notional value was $32B, the 2008/9 value was $15B and
the 2009/10 value was $10B. The 50% decline in notional value between 2007/8 and
2008/9 is remarkable and contradicts an increase in hedging demand driving the in-
crease in the risk premiums. The entire weather derivatives market did not completely
rebound after the crisis, but the notional value increased by 20% to $12B in 2010/11.
To further examine the effect of financial sector stress on the supply of capital to
a market, I examine whether a contract’s margin requirement and total risk affected
its likelihood of collapsing in the crisis. I run probit regressions with the dependent
variable equal to 1 if the contract collapsed. I define a market as collapsing if the
contract traded in the 12 months pre-crisis, but did not trade in the first 12 months
after the start of the crisis. Whether or not the contract traded is based on open
interest 32 days before maturity. If the supply of capital is driving the collapse,
we would expect margin and total risk to be positively correlated with a contract
collapsing. In Table A.9, I report the results. When each explanatory variable is
included separately, the coefficients are positive and significant. When margin and
risk are both included in the probit, the coefficients are positive, but insignificant.
When an interaction term is included, the coefficient is just slightly negative and
insignificant, and the coefficients on margin and contract risk are positive. Overall,
the results are consistent with financial sector stress causing a decrease in capital
supply to the market. In fact, because the higher margin and more volatile contracts
were more likely to collapse, I may be underestimating the effect of financial sector
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stress on risk premiums.
[Table A.9 Here]
1.5.4 Robustness
A maintained assumption throughout the previous tests is that there is zero sys-
tematic risk in the weather derivatives market. This assumption is in line with the
prevailing sentiment among market participants. The Weather Risk Management As-
sociation writes “weather essentially is uncorrelated with secular or systemic risk in
general financial markets and provides an opportunity for diversification for traders.”
Unlike stocks, whose discount rates and cash flows are driven by changes in the econ-
omy, it is not obvious how or in what direction temperature outcomes in Cincinnati,
for example, would be correlated with the return on the market. Supporting this view,
Cao and Wei (1999) implement a Lucas (1978) equilibrium model with temperature
as a fundamental variable and find little evidence that temperature risks should be
priced.
Although realized returns are noisy and the return data is a relatively short time
series, I attempt to measure the amount of systematic risk in the market. Ideally,
tests for systematic risk would be conducted at the individual contract level because
risks will differ across the location, month and degree index dimensions. Contract
level regressions are not feasible with only 13 years of data, i.e. 13 observations per
contract. Instead, I run CAPM regressions at the market level. Regressions are of
the form:
Rp −Rf = β ∗ (Rm −Rf ) + α,
where Rp is the return on an equal-weighted portfolio of monthly weather derivative
contracts, Rf is the monthly risk-free rate and Rm is the monthly market return.
Returns are calculated using 2 different measures: “physical” returns and realized
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returns. The “physical” returns are Payoff
E[Payoff ]
−1, where Payoff is the realized payoff
of the contract and E[Payoff ] is the model implied expected payoff of the contract 32
days before maturity. The “physical” return proxies for contract returns if contracts
were priced at their actuarially fair value. The realized returns are calculated as
follows: Payoff
Price
− 1, Payoff is the realized payoff of the contract and Price is the
outstanding price 32 days before maturity. The realized return is the more natural
return for a CAPM style regression. For the “physical” return regressions, I include
a location-month in the portfolio return calculation if a contract was ever open 32
days before maturity for that location and month. If both an HDD and CDD contract
trade for the same month and location, then I use the index with the highest expected
payoff. For the realized return regression, only those contracts with a market price 32
days before maturity are included in the regression. The regressions include month
fixed effects to soak up any seasonality in the returns. I calculate White standard
errors as there is likely heteroskedasticity in returns.
The results are reported in Table A.10. The results from the “physical” return
regressions are reported in Columns 1-3 and the realized returns in Columns 4-6. I run
regressions for all contracts, as well as CDD contracts and HDD contracts separately.
The beta is significant at the 10% level in the realized return and the physical return
regressions with all contracts. The coefficients range from -.32 to -.55. The coefficients
imply that the market does poorly when temperatures are extreme. It appears that
a portion of the risk in the temperature market is systematic risk, but the amount of
systematic risk is negative.
[Table A.10 Here]
One may be concerned that an increase in the price of systematic risk is driving
the relationship between financial sector stress and risk premiums. This is not the
case. If the price of systematic risk increased during the crisis, we would expect risk
premiums to drop on average because the market has negative systematic risk. If
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anything, not adjusting for systematic risk will bias the regressions against finding
an increase in risk premiums. As further evidence that risk premiums are not being
driven by systematic risk, in Appendix A.3, I calculate location specific betas and
find that there is no relationship between a location’s beta and its average estimated
risk premium. Also in Appendix A.3, I control for a location’s beta in the difference-
in-difference regressions and the coefficients on margin and total risk are basically
unchanged and still highly significant. High beta contracts experienced higher risk
premiums during the crisis, but the effect is insignificant. In sum, it does not appear
that risk premiums increased in the weather derivatives market due to an increase in
the price of systematic risk.
For my tests to be properly identified, the model estimated expected payoff must
not be systematically biased during the financial crisis. This bias may manifest if
market forecasted temperatures were systematically biased during the crisis and not
captured by my model. To explain the observed results, forecasted temperatures
would have to be significantly warmer in the winter and cooler in the summer dur-
ing the financial crisis and the bias stronger for high-margin and riskier contracts.
This assumption is impossible to test without precise knowledge of the market’s fore-
casted temperatures. As a robustness, I can control for market expectations using
the realized payoffs of contracts. I run regressions where the negative logarithm of
the contract price is the dependent variable and I include the logarithm of realized
index payoffs as a control. The realized index payoffs should proxy for market ex-
pectations of contract payoffs. I use the negative logarithm of contract price because
the financial institutions are net long in the weather derivative’s market; an increased
risk premium is associated with a decline in price. I also control for the risk-free
rate and the logarithm of the realized degree index on the contract’s location during
the previous month. By controlling for the realized payoff, this regression gives the
market a lookahead bias.
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I present the results in Table A.11. In Column 1, I include the financial crisis
dummy variable and the control variables. The coefficient is .054 and significant at
the 1% level. Not surprisingly, this coefficient is of similar magnitude as in the risk
premium regression (3.34). It does not appear that a bias in the my pricing model
is driving the main result. In Columns 2-4 (5-7), I include the interaction between
contract margin (coefficient of variation) and the financial crisis dummy. The results
are very similar to the risk premium regressions. The interaction between margin
and the financial crisis is positive and significant in all regressions. The coefficient
on the interaction between the crisis and the coefficient of variation is positive in all
specifications and is significant at the 1% level for the entire sample and the HDD sub-
sample. If realized temperatures are a reasonable proxy for forecasted temperatures,
then systematic bias in market temperature forecasts is not driving the results.
[Table A.11 Here]
Another concern is that there was an unobserved shift in the structure and use
of the weather derivatives market around the start of the crisis (e.g. new regulation
of the financial sector or the decline in natural gas prices following the shale gas
boom) and this led to high risk premiums and low open interest. The fact that open
interest did not rebound by the end of 2009 is consistent with a long-term structural
shift. Natural gas prices remained low relative to their 2007-2008 peak and any
regulatory regime shift likely did not ease through the sample period. If a structural
shift is driving the results, we would expect contract prices to continue to remain low
after the crisis. In Table A.11, Column 8, I include a dummy variable for the post-
crisis period. This coefficient will capture the difference in contract price post-crisis
relative to pre-crisis. The coefficient is -.0170 and is insignificant. Prices post-crisis
were relatively higher than pre-crisis, i.e. risk premiums were actually lower. It does
not appear that a shift in regulation or the decline in natural gas prices is driving the
increase in risk premiums.
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As a further test, I run the difference-in-difference regressions with realized returns
instead of implied risk premiums as the dependent variable. There is little justification
for using realized returns considering ex post returns are not a good proxy for ex ante
premiums over such a short time period. In unreported results, in the regression
with all contracts, I find the coefficient on the financial crisis, margin interaction
and coefficient of variation interaction are positive, but insignificant. For the HDD
sub-sample, results are similar. For the CDD sub-sample, realized temperatures were
slightly cooler than normal in the summer of 2009, which led to a negative realized
return on CDD contracts during the crisis period. Overall, there is very little evidence
that a systematic bias in the difference between the model estimated expected payoffs
and market expectations during the crisis is driving the results.
1.6 Conclusion
During periods of financial sector stress, financial institutions’ capital constraints
may bind. This will limit their supply of capital to various markets and affect market
equilibrium prices and quantities. Supporting this notion, I document that during
a period of financial sector stress, risk premiums in the weather derivatives market
increased by over 30% and notional value declined by 50%. Higher margin contracts
experienced a greater shift in capital supply as financial institutions were less willing
to supply capital to these capital intensive markets. Consistent with the theories of
Froot and Stein (1998) and Garleanu, Pedersen and Poteshman (2009), which argue
that financial institutions willingness to bear risk is decreasing in the unhedgeable
portion of the asset’s variance, contracts with more total risk also experienced a
greater decline in capital supply during the crisis.
Overall, these results show that financial institutions’ funding constraints lead
to lower risk-sharing between hedgers and financial institutions during periods of
financial sector stress. Hedgers may experience lower investment, increased costs
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of debt and debt-like contracts (lines of credit, labor contracts, etc.) and lower firm
values when the financial sector is under stress. Although I examine a relatively small
and youthful market, the effects documented could exist in other markets where risks
cannot be perfectly hedged. The results give insight into the risks investors and
hedgers face, the importance of financial sector capital in the pricing of contracts,
and how risks are shared in the economy.
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CHAPTER II
Can Markets Discipline Government Agencies?
Evidence from the Weather Derivatives Market
2.1 Abstract
The Chicago Mercantile Exchange has introduced several temperature related
derivative contracts on different U.S. cities in a staggered fashion since 1999. The
payoffs of these contracts depend on the temperature levels at a specific weather sta-
tion in the underlying city. We show that the introduction of these contracts improves
the accuracy of temperature measurement by the dedicated weather station of the
National Weather Services (NWS) in that city. We argue that temperature-based
financial markets generate additional scrutiny of the temperature data measured by
the NWS, which in turn motivates the agency to minimize measurement errors. Con-
sistent with this idea, stations with higher economic interests in weather derivatives
see greater improvement in measurement accuracy. Our results indicate that the
visibility and scrutiny generated by financial markets can improve the efficiency of
government agencies even in the absence of explicit incentive contracts.
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2.2 Introduction
How do financial markets affect real outcomes? This is a question of fundamental
importance to economists and policymakers. It has long been argued that market
prices can influence real decisions of economic actors by aggregating information
in a meaningful way (Hayek, 1945). Similarly, markets can enable individuals and
households to achieve optimal risk-sharing in the economy (Allen and Gale, 1994).
An additional channel through which markets can influence real outcomes is via their
role in affecting the economic agent’s effort level. While this line of research has been
studied well for corporations, little is known about the role of markets in influencing
the performance of government agencies. Our paper fills this gap in the literature by
exploiting an interesting empirical setting: the launch of a new financial market that
has payoffs linked to the measurement of temperature by National Weather Service
(NWS).1
There is a rich theoretical and empirical literature highlighting the importance of
financial markets in disciplining corporate managers.2 This line of research argues
that market participants such as block-holders and pension funds can discipline cor-
porate managers through explicit or implicit performance-based incentive contracts
(e.g., see Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Holmstrom and Tirole (1993), Burkart, Gromb,
and Paunzi (1997), Bolton and Von Thadden (1998), Gopalan (2009), Admati and
Pfleiderer (2009), and Edmans (2009).). But why should a government bureaucracy
respond to financial markets when there is no market-based incentive mechanism in
place?
1Our study also contributes to the literature on the role of financial innovations and derivative
contracts on real outcomes (e.g., Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), Tufano (2003), and Stulz
(2004)). Unlike the prior empirical literature that studies the effect of derivative contracts on firms
using them, we study their effect on the actions of a government bureaucracy.
2There are numerous important contributions in this area. They have been nicely summarized in
survey articles such as Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Gillan and Starks (1998), Black (1998), Karpoff
(1998), Romano (2001), Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), and Becht, Bolton, and Roell (2003) among
others.
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We argue that the launch of financial markets linked to NWS reported temperature
numbers generates additional visibility and scrutiny of its actions, which in turn
produces better outcomes by the agency even in the absence of any explicit incentive
contract. The underlying motivations behind better outcomes can range from the
avoidance of potential reputational losses to career concerns of the NWS officers. In
analyzing the motivations and biases of bureaucrats, Prendergast (2007) notes that
the clients of a bureaucracy typically point out errors when it harms them. As the
client’s capability in pointing out these mistakes increases, it is even more likely that
the mistakes are caught and immediately pointed out. The introduction of derivative
contracts creates a new set of clients for the NWS, who are likely to be both skillful
and motivated in pointing out measurement errors. This additional scrutiny increases
the likelihood that the NWS will suffer reputational loss due to poor measurement.
If a public agency experiences a loss in reputation they may be subject to political
hearings and downsizing. Noted social scientist James Q. Wilson observes, “The
head of a business firm is judged and rewarded on the basis of the firm’s earnings–the
bottom line. The head of a public agency is judged and rewarded on the basis of
the appearance of success, when success can mean reputation, influence, charm, the
absence of criticism, personal ideology, or victory in public debate” (Wilson (1989),
page 197).
In a similar spirit, Dewatripont, Jewitt, and Tirole (1999) stress the importance of
career concerns as a motivating tool for bureaucrats. Finally, once a weather-related
financial market opens up, there is a higher probability of disputes arising out of
improper recording of the temperature since an error can now cause immediate and
direct financial loss to third parties. Even though the government agency may not
be a party in resulting litigations, they may experience negative publicity or a loss of
reputation due to the lawsuit.3
3We provide a number of pieces of descriptive evidence, collected from a variety of sources such
as NWS’s directives and the industry interest groups’ documents, in support of these channels.
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Our empirical tests exploit the staggered introduction of weather derivative con-
tracts based on daily temperature levels of several U.S. cities over the past 14 years.
Weather has a large impact on a variety of economic and social decisions. While
there has always been a need for hedging weather related risk by sectors such as
utilities and crop production, it was only in 1999 that the Chicago Mercantile Ex-
change (CME) introduced its first exchange traded weather derivative instruments.
Since then, the CME has introduced weather contracts on a number of U.S. cities in
waves. A vast majority of these instruments are temperature related, allowing the
end-users to hedge their exposure to undesirable warm or cold weather conditions.4
These contracts are city specific and are settled based on the temperature readings
of a specific NWS weather station within or near the contract city. These stations
are almost always located at the underlying city’s main airport, and are prone to
measurement errors due to factors such as improper calibration of the sensors, poor
maintenance, and lax monitoring of the equipment. The introduction of derivative
contracts directly ties the NWS reported temperature measures at these stations to
the large economic interests of traders and hedgers in the market.
As of June 30, 2012 there are 24 U.S. cities with temperature related deriva-
tive contracts trading on them. These contracts were issued in four different waves
in 1999-2000, 2003, 2005, and 2008. Our empirical setting allows us to compare
the improvement in temperature accuracy of the weather stations with derivatives
(the treatment group) around the derivative launch dates with a set of non-shocked
stations (the control group) during the same period. The staggered nature of the
derivative launch allows us to separate the effect of any time trend in error rate or
any general improvement in NWS’s technology over time from improvements due to
derivative introduction. Our empirical setting has another important advantage in
terms of establishing causality. Unlike stocks, bonds, or foreign currencies, the vari-
4As per the survey results of Weather Risk Management Association (WRMA), an industry
body for weather risk, in notional terms, more than 95% of these contracts are temperature related.
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able underlying the weather derivatives contract is not a traded commodity and is
completely exogenous. Thus the introduction of the derivative contract is not going
to affect the value of the underlying asset – a concern that is always present in studies
that analyze the effect of derivative contracts on the underlying assets.
We obtain the initial or raw temperatures from a report, called METAR report,
produced hourly by the NWS. These reports contain the initial record of tempera-
ture for each weather station and are disseminated immediately to users. The initial
temperature records can sometimes be erroneous due to reasons such as equipment
malfunction, improper installation of the equipment, or improper calibration and
maintenance of the station.5 At the time of its initial report, NWS makes it clear
that the initial temperature numbers are preliminary and subject to change based
on their data cleaning and verification exercise. To compute the accuracy of these
numbers, we obtain corrected temperature data from two sources. National Climatic
Data Center (NCDC), an affiliated agency of NWS, is mandated with the task of
correcting mistakes in NWS measurement and issuing a restatement after a time lag.
In addition, a private company called MDA Information Systems Inc. (MDA) spe-
cializes in correcting the raw temperature data from the NWS. They use a number of
techniques to correct the error in initial measurement including recovering data from
alternative sources, using their proprietary model to correct mistakes, cross-checking
the NWS data against other nearby stations and by calling up the climate centers, in-
cluding NWS field offices, to discuss possible errors. We define measurement error as
any discrepancy between the raw values obtained from METAR reports and the cor-
rected values. Our results are not dependent on the source of corrected temperature
values since NCDC and MDA reported temperatures are almost identical.
We obtain measurement error data for all the weather stations with derivative
contracts along with a set of control stations. Using a sample period of 1999-2012
5For example, see NWS instruction number 10-1302 or NWS 10-1004 for steps undertaken by
the weather stations to minimize errors in the data gathering exercise.
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for 49 treatment and control stations, we find that the median weather station in
our sample has an error rate of 12 days per year. To examine the effect of derivative
introduction on error rate, we estimate a difference-in-differences model using station
and year fixed effects. Our estimation shows that after the introduction of weather
derivative contracts, the treated station’s error rate comes down significantly by 1.6
to 2.4 days depending on the model specification. The decline in error rate represents
about 13-20% of the median error rate in our sample. Thus, weather stations with
derivative contracts have lower incidence of inaccurate data after their recorded tem-
perature numbers become reference points for billions of dollars of financial contracts
in an open market.
Are these improvements driven by economic interests generated by the financial
contracts? To answer this question, we conduct three tests. First, we show that the
improvement is larger for stations that received derivative contracts in earlier waves.
These stations are likely to have relatively higher economic interests based on CME’s
revealed preference. Second, we show that the effects are stronger for cities with rela-
tively higher populations, i.e., for cities that are likely to have higher energy demands
and hence higher economic interests in weather derivative products. In our third test,
we exploit an interesting seasonality of this market. An overwhelming majority of
these contracts are traded in very hot and cold months. The Heating Degree Day con-
tracts (HDD) are used by hedgers in the winter months to hedge against variability
in cold weather. Conversely, the Cooling Degree Days (CDD) contracts are used in
summer months to hedge against variability in hot weather. There are two months of
the year, called the “cross-over months” by many market participants, when there is
very little activity in either contract’s market. These are the months of April and Oc-
tober. Consistent with our assertion that economic interests influence measurement
accuracy, we find that all the accuracy improvements come from months excluding
April and October, and there is no change in the measurement accuracy in these two
42
months.6 Overall these results establish our main claim that the launch of weather
derivatives results in better measurement outcomes by the NWS and the result is
most likely linked with economic interests generated through derivative contracts.
There are two main channels of improvement that could lead to the decrease
in error rates: better technology or better effort by NWS employees. If the NWS
improves its technology at the derivative launch stations precisely at the time of
derivative introduction, then the effect that we document would come mainly from
this improvement. We provide both anecdotal and empirical evidence to the contrary.
While NWS weather stations undergo regular upgrades in their measurement tech-
nology, we show the major shift in technology happened before September 1999, i.e.,
before the launch of CME weather derivatives. Additionally, our test based on the
seasonality of this market allows us to separate the two channels as well. If the NWS
selectively introduces better equipment at these stations at the time of derivative
launch then the improvement in measurement accuracy should be felt throughout
the year. If, on the other hand, better effort is put forth by officials when economic
interests are high, then we expect to see higher improvement in peak months and not
much of a difference in April and October. As mentioned above, our results support
the latter interpretation. Finally, we investigate the extent of maintenance activity
performed by NWS at these weather stations to directly link the launch of derivatives
launch to the agency’s actions. Consistent with our effort based interpretation, we
document a significant increase in the frequency of maintenance operations by the
NWS for derivative stations with higher economic interests.
Our results have important implications for the role of markets in improving ef-
ficiency. While there has been a large body of research on the role of markets in
improving the allocative efficiency of the economy, little is known empirically about
6As a robustness exercise, we widen the cross-over period to six months including months imme-
diately preceding and following April and October. We show that our results mainly come from the
peak activity months of June-August and December-February, i.e., from a period of high economic
interest in this market.
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the role of markets in improving government agencies’ actions. Our evidence shows
that while governments often regulate markets for better behavior by market partic-
ipants, markets can regulate governments through the channels of increased scrutiny
and visibility. These improvements in government performance can affect real out-
comes as the benefits accrue to society as a whole. The positive externality of better
weather measurement could be enjoyed by the many businesses that rely on timely and
accurate temperature measurements to make decisions. As an example, energy com-
panies use both high and low frequency temperature data to plan energy production.
An improvement in temperature accuracy will lead to better production planning by
such companies. Indeed, NCDC has established a number of sector-specific user en-
gagement programs that highlight the needs for timely and accurate data by a diverse
set of industries such as energy, transportation, tourism, and construction.7 In this
respect, our study directly relates to the role of financial innovations and derivatives
in affecting real outcomes.8 Our study also relates to the literature on the effect of
financial derivatives on firm valuation. Perez-Gonzalez and Yun (2012) analyze the
effect of weather risk-management on energy utilities. They show that derivative
usage leads to higher valuation, investments and leverage for such firms.9
Finally, our study contributes to the corporate governance literature that focuses
on the role of markets in disciplining corporate managers. Our paper complements
this literature by providing evidence on the monitoring role of markets in a public
sector setting. Researchers have for long recognized the difficulty in achieving efficient
outcomes in government bureaucracies through performance based incentive contracts
(e.g., see Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (1997)). The difficulty arises mainly because
7see http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/userengagement/userengagement.html .
8See Tufano (2003) for a survey on financial innovation including the role of innovation on society.
See Stulz (2004) for a survey of the literature and discussions on costs and benefits of derivatives.
9There is a large literature on the effect of financial derivatives on firm valuation and investment
decisions in non-weather risk related context as well. For example, see Allayannis and Weston
(2001), Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006), Purnanandam (2007), and Berrospide, Purnanandam,
and Rajan (2010) among others.
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the goals of a public agency are not easily defined and the performance relative to
these goals is also hard to quantify. Heckman et al. (1997) study the performance
standard systems of Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA) to assess the effectiveness
of incentive contracts in such a setting.10 Our study shows that visibility generated
through financial contracts that are tied to the bureaucracies’ actions can work as
a device to obtain better outcomes from these agencies. This mechanisms can be
especially useful for agencies that face difficulty in establishing performance based
contracts. Overall our study has important implications for the literature on the effi-
ciency of public enterprise (see Karpoff (2001)) and financial markets’ role in making
public bureaucracies more efficient.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.3 we describe the
weather derivatives market in detail and highlight some key aspects of temperature
measurement by the NWS. Section 2.4 describes the data and provides sample statis-
tics. Section 2.5 provides the empirical design and results of the paper. Section 2.6
concludes.
2.3 Weather Derivatives Market
Weather has a significant impact on the operating and financial performance of
several industries, municipalities, and households. Some survey evidence suggests that
over $3 trillion of the U.S. GDP is associated with weather-sensitive industries.11 In-
dustries such as energy, construction, food processing, retail, and transportation are
especially exposed to weather risk. Weather derivative products can provide insur-
ance against weather related losses to these businesses. In addition, these products
provide an alternative investment and diversification opportunity to the financial in-
10Heinrich (2002) provides a detailed discussion of outcome-based performance management for
public sector agencies. Dixit (2002) provides an overview of the theory of incentives with a special
focus on the public sector.
11See Dutton (2002) for details.
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vestment community. While the need for insurance against weather conditions has
been felt for a long time, it was only in 1999 that the first set of exchange traded
weather contracts was listed on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (CME). The ex-
change launched temperature based futures and options contracts on 10 U.S. cities
within 13 months of September 1999. It launched contracts on several other cities
in three more waves in 2003, 2005, and 2008. As of June 30, 2012, CME weather
contracts are available for 24 U.S. cities spanning all broad meteorological areas of the
country.12 We provide a timeline of the introduction of these contracts in Figure B.1.
As described in detail later, the staggered introduction of these contracts provides us
with several econometric advantages in identifying the effect of the derivatives market
on the NWS station’s error rate.
[Figure B.1 Here]
As of September 2005, approximately the middle point of our sample period, the
total notional value of all CME traded weather contracts amounted to about $22
billion and an overwhelming majority of weather contracts are based on temperature.
Based on survey evidence, the Weather Risk Management Association (WRMA) re-
ported that over 95% of the CME contracts, in notional value terms, were related
to temperature in 2005-06 (WRMA Survey Report (2006)). Other major categories
included contracts on rain, wind, and snow. Temperature related contracts insure the
buyers from either excessive heat or cold during a specified period of time. There are
two types of contracts under this category: Heating Degree Days (HDD) and Cooling
Degree Days (CDD) contracts. The buyer of an HDD contract receives payments
for cold days defined as days with average temperature below 650F; conversely the
buyer of a CDD contract receives payments for hot days defined as days with average
12In addition to these 24 cities, CME also has snowfall contracts on Newark and the hurricane
index on the Eastern US from Brownsville, Texas to Eastport, Maine. We do not include these two
locations in our analysis since our focus is on city specific temperature related contracts.
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temperature exceeding 650F. These contracts are written on observed temperature of
a specific city for a specific period.
An Example Contract: As an illustration, consider a CDD option contract
on Chicago for the month of August. The contract specifies a weather station in
Chicago as the reference station for this trade. The weather station is typically
located near the underlying city’s airport and is identified by a WBAN number.13 The
Chicago contracts in our example are settled based on the weather station at O’Hare
International Airport with WBAN station number 94846. Every day in August the
CDD contract compares the average of daily maximum and minimum temperatures
(Tavg) reported at this station with 65
0F and computes the cooling degree for the
day as max[0, Tavg − 65]. These degree days are cumulated over the entire month of
August and payments are made based on the cumulative month-end number called
the CDD index for August. Typically, one point in the index entitles the buyer to
a payment of $20 from the seller. With hundreds of thousands of such contracts
in the market, the reported temperature at these stations has tremendous economic
implications for the market participants.
The final settlement of these contracts are based on the CDD or HDD index
reported by MDA Information Systems, Inc. The settlement occurs on the second
business day after the contract month.14 MDA (formerly Earth Satellite Corporation,
founded in 1969) is a private company and a leading provider of weather data to the
weather trading industry. CME uses MDA’s services to obtain temperatures based
on NWS data for its trade settlements. MDA obtains weather data reported from
the NWS and performs several quality control checks before transmitting it to the
CME for trade settlements. MDA’s quality checks are based on cross-verification,
consistency of the data with other nearby stations, and their own meteorological
13WBAN, an acronym for Weather-Bureau-Army-Navy, is a five-digit weather station number
that uniquely identifies a measurement location.
14See the guidelines on CME’s website at: http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/weather/files/Monthly-
CDD-Index-Futures-Final-Settlement-Procedure.pdf
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models. For example, NWS occasionally reports missing temperature data for a
weather station. The missing data can arise due to improper recording or other
instrument malfunctions. In such cases, “MDA Federal first attempts to recover this
data from alternative data sources, such as Climate Summary Reports, contacting
the local NWS office or local media reports, as appropriate.” (quoted from MDA’s
procedure manual). This is one direct example of increased outside scrutiny and
visibility of the temperature numbers reported by the NWS.
2.3.1 Temperature Measurement and Sources of Error
There are many government agencies that coordinate to meet the public’s weather
needs. The ultimate weather authority is the Department of Commerce (DOC), which
is a Cabinet department of the federal government. Within the DOC, the National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is a bureau “focused on the con-
dition of the oceans and the atmosphere.” NOAA oversees 6 main offices out of which
2 offices focus on surface temperatures: the National Weather Service (NWS) and
the National Environmental Satellite, Data and Information Service (NESDIS). The
NWS handles most weather related government activities, including producing and
disseminating temperature readings. The NESDIS manages and archives data col-
lected by many government agencies. The National Climactic Data Center (NCDC)
is an office within the NESDIS that archives and processes past weather records. In
summary, the NWS and NOAA are the main agencies ensuring accurate on site mea-
surement of temperatures throughout the United States, while the NCDC handles
cleaning and storing past temperatures.
As mentioned earlier, weather derivative contracts are settled on the basis of tem-
perature readings produced by the underlying WBAN stations. Although there could
be multiple weather stations within a city, 23 out of 24 CME derivative stations
are located at the city’s main airport. A great degree of care is needed to obtain
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temperature with high accuracy even in a laboratory setting (e.g., see McGee (1988)
for a detailed analysis of temperature measurement issues). These WBAN stations
measure temperature in an outside environment, which can be even more difficult
to measure with precision. A wide variety of factors affect accurate temperature
measurement at a WBAN station. These factors can be broadly classified into three
(non-exclusive) groups: (a) technological, (b) environmental, and (c) human. The
technological factors relate to basic quality of the thermometer such as the sensor’s
effectiveness, calibration errors, and self-heating of the instrument. Environmental
factors relate to issues such as the location of the sensors and the effect of nearby
electric disturbances, radiation, sunlight, and wind. The human factor captures the
effect of manual intervention needed to measure temperature accurately. These inter-
ventions come in several forms such as active maintenance of the instrument, proper
calibration, and minimizing the impact of environmental factors that can lead to
inaccurate reports.
An Example of Measurement Error: A well publicized case from the Oahu
weather station in Hawaii provides an illustrative example of measurement error in
temperature. In June, 2009, the NWS weather station at the Honolulu airport re-
ported a daily maximum temperature of 920F for 6 consecutive days. On the same
days, a nearby tsunami warning station located about 3 miles away reported tem-
perature that was about 60F to 90F below the Honolulu station’s recordings. Once
this discrepancy was pointed out, NOAA officials investigated the situation and de-
tected an error at the Honolulu station. After reparation of the Honolulu station, the
temperature recordings of the two stations converged. In this example, the initial tem-
perature recorded at the Honolulu station would be subsequently corrected/restated
to reflect this error.
NOAA and NWS have detailed procedure manuals for collecting these readings in
a timely and accurate manner. They also issue regular directives to their field offices
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on best practices in measuring temperature. These directives can be obtained from
NOAA’s website.15 As an example, consider the NWS instruction 10-1302, dated
June 21, 2010. It details out requirements and standards for NWS temperature and
precipitation recordings.16 It lays out procedures for proper installation, monitoring,
and maintenance of these instruments. A few examples of these guidelines are: (a) the
instrument must be placed at least 100 feet from any concrete or paved surface; (b) all
attempts should be made to avoid areas with rough terrain, air drainage, areas where
water tends to collect, and areas where drifting snow collects; (c) the instrument
should not have any major obstruction (for example nearby buildings, trees, or fence)
close-by that can affect its readings. Similarly, the NWS directive 10-1004 issued
on February 17, 2011 provides a detailed set of instructions on the monitoring of
surface weather stations. These instructions point out the possible sources of error in
temperature measurement and the NWS’s attempts at training their staff to minimize
these error rates. These guidelines also show the role of humans in measuring weather
variables in an accurate manner.
In addition to CME and MDA, traders and financial parties regularly monitor
these numbers and establish financial positions in this market based on their needs.
Weather scientists have taken note of the increased attention paid to climate observa-
tions by the private sector in recent years (e.g., see Changnon and Changnon (2010)).
As expected, NOAA, NWS and weather industry professionals have all recognized
the need for better data quality from the WBAN stations. A number of initiatives
such as joint conferences and exchange of ideas have taken place between these groups
in light of the weather derivatives introduction. A workshop report in 2002 by the
American Meteorological Society (Muranane et al. (2002)) discusses the data needs
of the private sector of the weather derivatives market.
We argue that the introduction of a weather derivative market attaches immediate
15http://www.nws.noaa.gov/directives/010/010.htm.
16See http://www.nws.noaa.gov/directives/sym/pd01013002curr.pdf
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and large economic importance to the NWS temperature numbers, which in turn
results in tremendous scrutiny of these numbers by investors, media, and other related
parties. Indeed, the NWS also recognizes the need for better data collection exercises
in light of the increased scrutiny by outside parties. In the Appendix, we provide
an excerpt from an NWS directive to the field offices that highlights this aspect of
monitoring. We also provide an excerpt from a meeting of NWS officials with weather
industry representatives regarding the need for better data in the Appendix. In the
rest of the paper we empirically test our main hypothesis that markets improve the
measurement accuracy of NWS temperature recordings.
2.4 Data
We collect data from several sources and combine them together for our analysis.
We first collect information on the launch dates of monthly derivative contracts on
a city’s temperature from the CME and press releases. For some cities, the CME
introduced weekly and seasonal contracts at a later date as well. These contracts
were introduced after the monthly contracts, hence we focus on the monthly contract
introduction dates. There are 24 weather stations with temperature derivative con-
tracts as of June, 2012. In addition, we identify 25 stations without weather derivative
contracts as the control group. The 25 control weather stations are chosen by sorting
all U.S. metropolitan areas by population and using the 25 highest population cities
without weather derivatives. We use the 2011 population estimates for metropoli-
tan areas from the United States Census Bureau for this purpose.17 We identify the
WBAN number (i.e., the exact station number) of all derivative cities based on the
contract specification. For the control cities, we use the weather station at the largest
nearby airport. In total we have 49 weather stations in our sample. These weather
stations, their WBAN identification number, and the derivative introduction dates
17http://www.census.gov/popest/data/metro/totals/2011/
51
for the treatment group are provided in Table B.1. There have been four main waves
of derivative introductions: 1999-2000, 2003, 2005, and 2008. The list of derivative
stations cover mostly large cities as well as a few smaller cities that are likely to have
large economic interests tied to weather.
[Table B.1 Here]
We obtain all weather data from MDA Information Systems, Inc. As mentioned
earlier, MDA is a leading provider of weather data to weather traders as well as to
the CME. We obtain two pieces of information for each weather station: (i) the raw
temperature readings, and (ii) the cleaned or corrected temperature values. The raw
temperature readings are the actual reported temperature numbers by the NWS or
an affiliated organization for each station on a given day. We obtain data on the daily
maximum and minimum temperature because the weather derivative contracts are
settled based on the average of these two values. The raw temperature comes from
METAR readings, which are standardized weather reports produced by Automated
Surface Observing Systems stations. These stations are collectively operated by the
Federal Aviation Administration, National Weather Service and the Department of
Defense. For expositional simplicity we call these stations NWS operated stations
throughout the paper since they are the main nodal agency for temperature related
activities. MDA obtains the raw temperature data for each WBAN station from the
NWS METAR reports.18
The second key measure is the ‘cleaned’ or ‘corrected’ temperature value for every
station-date pair. MDA uses a detailed five step process to clean the raw temperature
values obtained from the government agencies. Through this process they ensure that
18The NWS stations produce hourly weather reports, 6-hour min/max temperature reports and
24-hour min/max temperature reports at midnight local time. We obtain the 24-hour min/max
temperature values as the measures of raw temperature. If this value is not available for a specific
station-date, then MDA provides us with the minimum and maximum temperature based on 6-hour
or hourly reports.
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the data is consistent with nearby reporting stations, and it conforms to meteorolog-
ical consistency. They also take care of missing temperature values, which occur in
the NWS reports due to reasons such as improper or incomplete METAR record-
ings. If the raw data has missing values, MDA uses other sources, such as NWS
Climate Summary Reports, contacts at the local NWS office or local media reports
to obtain temperature values. Equally important, MDA checks all the raw tempera-
tures for erroneous values by checking “the data against itself and against alternative
data sources, such as hourly data, Climate Summary Reports, surrounding stations,
and additional observations, as appropriate.” MDA’s meteorologists then examine
the temperatures to ensure they are meteorologically consistent, i.e., they conform to
basic consistency checks against other weather related variables. If temperatures are
missing or erroneous, then new values are created using proprietary estimation tech-
niques of the MDA. Using this detailed process, MDA arrives at a clean temperature
measure that is used widely by the financial services industry as well as several other
sectors. In essence, the MDA cleaned values are third-party corrected temperature
numbers for these weather stations. We use the difference between the corrected and
raw value as our key measure of measurement error in NWS temperature recordings.
We also obtain data on cleaned temperatures with corrections to the raw NWS
temperature numbers from the NCDC. NCDC issues these official temperatures with
a couple months’ time lag. These corrections, or restatements, by the NCDC provide
us with yet another measure of measurement accuracy at the time of initial report.
Further information on preliminary and cleaned data can be obtained from NWS
instruction manuals such as NWSI 10-1004 dated February 17, 2011 (NWS, 2011)
and NWSPS 10-10 dated September 29, 2010 (NWS, 2010). NCDC restated numbers
are extremely close to the MDA corrected values. Therefore, we use the difference
between NWS raw numbers and MDA corrected values as the main variable in all
our tests. We prefer the MDA based clean values because it alleviates the concern
53
that the government agencies may be less inclined to restate their recordings after
these contracts begin to trade. Figure B.2 provides a timeline of initial temperature
measurement by the NWS, the corrections reported by MDA for contract settlement
by CME, and the final cleaned value generated by NCDC.
[Figure B.2 Here]
2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Our sample covers all 49 stations, 24 with derivative contracts and 25 control
stations, from 1999 to 2011. We begin in 1999 because we are unable to obtain
high quality historical data on raw NWS temperature values for years prior to 1999.
This data restriction should have only a minor impact on our study because 20 out
of 24 treatment stations received derivative contracts after 1999. Thus we have 20
stations for which we have data on both before and after the derivatives’ introduction
– we exploit the variation generated by these stations around the launch date in our
empirical tests.
We take the number of days a given station reports erroneous or missing values as
the main measure of temperature inaccuracy. These are the dates when the raw and
corrected values differ from each other. We aggregate this number at the yearly level
and use the yearly count as the key measure of measurement error rate of a station
in a year. We have 49 annual observations spread over 13 years in our sample. Some
station-years show considerable error rate leading to skewness in the data. The Los
Angeles weather station, for example, has very high levels of error rate across many
years. In our empirical tests we remove such station specific effects using station fixed
effects. Further, we winsorize the data at 5% from both tails to ensure that our results
are not driven by outlier observations. We also use log transformed error rate as an
alternative measure of the dependent variable to alleviate concerns about outliers. As
reported later, our results remain robust to either specification. Summary statistics
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are presented in Table B.2. A representative median station reports about 12 error
days per year. There is considerable cross-sectional variation in the data as evident
by the 90th (20 days) and 10th (5 days) percentiles of error days in the sample (see
also Figure B.3). In unreported results, we find that raw and final numbers remain
the same for 96.69% of days. Of the remaining 3.31% days, 2.12% have a difference
of 10F between the raw and cleaned data. The remaining 1.19% observations have
considerably large discrepancies mostly ranging from 2-100F .
[Table B.2 Here]
[Figure B.3 Here]
In addition to the main data on temperature recordings, we also obtain open
interest data from the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. We use this information to
analyze the relationship between derivative introduction and temperature accuracy
across months with high and low economic interest.
2.5 Empirical Design and Analysis
2.5.1 Research Design
We estimate the effect of weather derivative introduction on the accuracy of tem-
perature measurement in a difference-in-differences framework. We compare the mea-
surement accuracy of a weather derivative station after the shock (i.e., after the in-
troduction date) with the same station’s accuracy before the shock to get the first
margin of difference. The second margin of difference comes from the change in the
accuracy level of non-shocked stations around the same time period. The underlying
assumption is that the changes in the non-shocked stations’ accuracy level separates
out the effect of other (i.e., non-derivative related) factors on the accuracy level of the
shocked stations. These non-derivative related changes in accuracy can come from
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sources such as technological advancement over time, climatic changes, or NWS’ over-
all effort in improving its accuracy levels across all its stations. A key advantage of
the staggered launch of weather derivative contracts across cities is that it allows us
to remove the effect of any such macro-economic or broad climatic factors on mea-
surement accuracy. We implement this research design using the following regression
model using both station and year fixed effects:
yst = αs + β × derivativest + yeart + st (2.1)
yst denotes measurement error at the WBAN station s in year t; αs stands for
station fixed effects; yeart denotes the year fixed effects. derivativest takes a value of
one for station-year observations after the introduction of derivatives, zero otherwise.
The year of introduction is included in the post-introduction period. In this speci-
fication, station fixed effects remove the station specific component of measurement
error whereas year fixed effects control for broad time-specific effects including the
possibility of any secular improvement in measurement accuracy across all stations.
Thus, the coefficient on derivativest provides the difference-in-differences estimate of
interest.
The key identifying assumption behind our empirical exercise is that the weather
derivative’s launch is not correlated with any unobserved improvements in the sta-
tion’s ability to measure the temperature. It is unlikely that the unobserved ability
of the station officers change precisely at the same time when the derivative contracts
are launched. The staggered nature of our shock makes it even less likely that our
results are confounded by any such omitted factors. Further, our maintained assump-
tion is that the CME’s selection of these derivative contracts is primarily driven by
the demand for these hedging products at these cities, and not by anticipated im-
provement in the accuracy level of temperature measurement. Note that it poses
56
no identification challenge for us if the CME chooses these stations based on their
historical measurement accuracy. Station fixed effects separate out any such effect
from our analysis. Our estimation comes from within-station changes in the accuracy
level and not from the average differences between the stations.
Before presenting our main results, we estimate a simple selection model to un-
derstand the key drivers behind the selection of these stations. We estimate a Probit
model with a cross-section of 281 metropolitan cities obtained from the U.S. census
data.19 The dependent variable equals one for the 24 cities that have weather deriva-
tives and zero for the remaining cities. We include only three explanatory variables in
the model as proxies for the demand of weather derivative products. These variables
are: (a) the city’s population rank,20 (b) whether the city has any financial or com-
modity exchange or not,21 and (c) whether the city is the largest city in a top 15 crop
producing state.22 The key idea behind the selection of these variables is to capture
the effect of hedging demands from energy and farming sectors, two main end-users
of the weather derivative products, and the presence of financial intermediaries in
these cities. A city’s population is used as a proxy for energy demand. The largest
city in a top crop producing state is likely to have large trading interests related to
the farming sector. Finally, if a city has exchanges, such as the Kansas City Board
of Trade, then it is less costly for the financial intermediaries to trade with the end
users. Exchanges may also proxy for central locations in local economies that are
19For the selection model we use all metropolitan cities available in the U.S. census data. In
subsequent tests involving measurement errors, we limit our attention to control cities that are
highly populated. This ensures comparability across our treatment and control stations on important
dimensions such as the NWS-designated service level of the weather station.
202011 population estimates from the U.S. Census Bureau
21Financial exchange cities are: Chicago (CBOE, CME, etc.), Jersey City (EDGA, NSE), New
York (NYSE, NASDAQ, etc.), Philadelphia (Philadelphia Stock Exchange), Boston (Boston Stock
Exchange) and Lenexa (BATS Exchange). Commodities exchange cities: Chicago (CBOT, CME,
etc.), Atlanta (Intercontinental Exchange), Kansas City (KCBT), Memphis (Memphis Cotton Ex-
change), Minneapolis (Minneapolis Grain Exchange) and New York (NY Mercantile Exchange)
22Crop rankings are based on the state’s value-added to the U.S. economy by the agriculture
sector in 2011. Data is from the United States Department of Agriculture Economic Research
Service: http://www.ers.usda.gov/data-products/farm-income-and-wealth-statistics
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likely to have common weather risks.
With these three variables we estimate the Probit model and present the results
in Column 1 of Table B.3. Larger cities, top cities in farming states, and cities with
trading exchanges are all more likely to have a derivative contract, although the coef-
ficient on farming states is not significant. The McFadden’s Psuedo R2 of the model is
reasonably high, indicating that these simple measures of hedging demand capture a
large variation in the selection of these contracts.23 In Column 2, we estimate a model
that predicts the likelihood of receiving a derivative contract in the first wave, i.e.,
in 1999-2000. The dependent variable equals one for stations that received derivative
contracts in the first wave, and zero otherwise. The coefficient estimate on the high
crop variable increases in economic magnitude and is now significant at the 10% level.
The coefficients on population and exchange cities continue to be significant and have
similar economic magnitude. Overall these findings are consistent with our claim
that demand side considerations played a major role in the selection of these cities.
Further, cities chosen in earlier cohorts are more likely to have higher demands for
weather hedging products from energy and farming sectors.
[Table B.3 Here]
2.5.2 Empirical Analysis
We estimate the difference-in-differences model using data on 49 weather stations
for the 1999-2011 period. As mentioned earlier, 24 stations have the weather deriva-
tive contract, whereas 25 do not. The 25 control stations are the 25 most populated
cities that do not have a weather derivative contract. In addition to their population,
the treatment and control cities are comparable on several other relevant dimensions
as well. In particular, they are similar in terms of the NWS’s designated service level
23For interpretational simplicity of R2, we also estimate these models using a linear regression
model and obtain traditional R2 in the range of 30%.
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for the maintenance of the weather station. NWS classifies weather stations into 4
service levels (A,B,C, and D) based on air traffic and bad weather outcomes. Service
Level D stations are completely automated. Service Level C stations have an addi-
tional human observer when the tower is open. Service Levels A and B have a human
observer practically all the time, and the observers have more responsibilities at these
stations. Almost all of our treatment and control stations belong to category A, i.e.,
to a category that requires the utmost care from human observers.24 More important,
the service level of our treatment and control stations are comparable as documented
in Table B.1. Thus the control group is likely to serve as a reasonable counterfactual
for our study. We also document some other key characteristics of the treatment and
control group in the Table. These groups are comparable in terms of population and
air traffic level as well.25 In sum, the control cities are not very different from the
treatment cities in terms of their designated service levels and non-derivative related
interests in temperature.
As a prelude to the main regression analysis, we provide the average number of
error days for the shocked stations (treatment group) for the 3 years before and after
the shock and compare that to the corresponding averages of the control firms. We
take the average number of error days for all control stations during the given calendar
year for this exercise. We compute the average error days across the two groups for
the periods before and after the shock and plot them in Figure B.4.26 The error rate
drops slightly for the control group before and after the shock, whereas there is a
remarkable drop in the corresponding number for the treatment group. The average
error rate drops from 12.86 to 11.29 days per year for the treatment group compared
24Service level data comes from the Aviation Weather Assets Database:
http://apps.avmet.com/awad/AWADReport.cfm
25Air traffic ranks come from the Airports Council International: http://www.aci-
na.org/content/airport-traffic-reports
26For this figure, we are unable to use the data for stations that received derivatives in the first
wave of 1999-2000. We do not have data for the past three years for these stations. All our formal
tests, presented in the rest of the paper, include these stations as well.
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to a corresponding drop from 13.16 to 12.44 days per year for the control stations. In
our regression model, we formally assess the statistical significance of the difference
after removing the station and year fixed effects.
[Figure B.4 Here]
Results of the estimation exercise are provided in Table B.4. Models 1 and 2 use
the number of error days as the dependent variable, whereas Models 3 and 4 use its
log transformed values. Model 1 presents the results without year fixed effects. We
obtain a coefficient of -2.36 on the derivative variable, indicating a decline of about
2.36 days in the annual error rate. The effect is statistically significant at the 1%
level. In Model 2 we include the year fixed effects to remove the effect of any secular
improvement in weather measurement technology over time or other macroeconomic
and climatic changes that might affect the measurement error of all stations. We
obtain a coefficient estimate of -1.63 that is also significant at the 1% level. Models 3
and 4 obtain similar results and ensure that our estimates are not driven by outliers.
These baseline results establish the effect of derivatives introduction on measurement
accuracy: NWS reported raw temperature readings become significantly more accu-
rate once there is a direct financial market interest tied to these readings. In real
terms, depending on the model specification these estimates translate into a decline
of about 13-20% in the error rate of the median station after the introduction of the
derivative contracts.
[Table B.4 Here]
As a robustness exercise, we check for and rule out the presence of any pre-existing
declining trend in the error days of the shocked stations. We compute the change in
error days from three years before to the year before derivative introduction. Before
the shock both treatment and control stations show an increase, not a decrease, in
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the error rate. The shocked stations experienced an average change of +7% in the
error rate during the pre-introduction period as compared to the control stations.
The difference in the rate of change for the two groups during the pre-shock period
is statistically indistinguishable from zero. After the introduction of the derivative,
however, the treatment stations experience a steady decline over the next three years.
By the end of the third year after the shock, there is a decline of about 20% in the error
rate of the shocked stations as compared to the corresponding decline for the control
stations. This shows that there is no declining trend in measurement error of shocked
stations before the launch, but a remarkable decline afterwards. The improvement,
therefore, is likely caused by the introduction of financial markets.
Overall these results show that the introduction of temperature related financial
contracts results in better measurement outcomes by the NWS. We argue that these
effects arise due to increased economic interests and the resulting scrutiny of these
measures by market participants. As economic interests increase, the reputational
costs of measurement error are likely to increase as well. Market participants are
more likely to monitor these numbers and point out mistakes when economic interests
are high.
If an increase in economic interests is driving the improvement in temperature
readings, then we would expect locations with higher economic interests to see greater
improvement. Our next set of tests is designed to exploit the cross-sectional variation
in the level of economic interests across cities to provide evidence in support of this
channel.
2.5.3 Economic Interests and Channels of Improvement
2.5.3.1 Cohort Analysis
We first exploit the variation generated by the year of introduction of these con-
tracts to relate economic interests to measurement errors. Contracts introduced in
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earlier cohorts are likely to have higher economic interests as compared to later co-
horts. This is based on the underlying assumption that CME’s incentive to introduce
a weather contract in a city is primarily driven by the demand for weather hedging
products in that city. Thus cities with higher demand are likely to get these contracts
in earlier cohorts. This assumption is consistent with our results in the selection model
discussed earlier in Section 2.5.1 of the paper. We expect a higher impact of derivative
launch on measurement accuracy for the earlier cohort as compared to later ones.
We separately estimate the effect of derivative introduction on measurement ac-
curacy for each cohort as a first test of this hypothesis. We take all the shocked
stations for a given cohort and include data from 1999 (i.e., the beginning year of
the sample) to three years after the introduction year in the sample. We limit the
sample to three years post-derivative introduction to estimate our main effects in
the immediate aftermath of the launch. As an example, for the 2003 cohort, we in-
clude data from 2000 to 2006 for all the stations that launched derivative contracts in
2003 (Kansas City, Houston, Boston, Minneapolis, and Sacramento) in the treatment
group. All the non-derivative stations during these years are included in the control
group. Results are provided in Table B.5. We obtain a negative coefficient on the
derivative variable for all four cohorts, with significant coefficients for all but one.
Consistent with our hypothesis, the strongest effect comes from the earliest cohort
(2000) in the sample, whereas the weakest result comes from the last cohort (2008).
For the 2000 cohort, we find a decline of almost 5 days per year in the error rate.
The corresponding improvements are -2.0, -2.7, and -1.0 for the 2003, 2005, and 2008
cohorts, respectively.
[Table B.5 Here]
As an additional empirical test of the cohort effect, we estimate the following
62
model:
yst = αs + βearly · derivativeearlyst + βlate · derivativelatest + yeart + st (2.2)
In this model derivativeearlyst equals one for years after the derivative launch for all
cities in the 1999/2000 cohorts, and zero otherwise; derivativelatest equals one for years
after the derivative launch for all cities in the later cohorts, and zero otherwise. This
model modifies our base case specification by allowing us to separately estimate the
effect for the earliest cohort versus the rest. We estimate this model with data from
the entire sample period. Results are provided in the last column of Table B.5. The
coefficient estimate of -5.1 on derivativeearlyst is considerably larger than the estimate
of -1.2 on derivativelatest variable. The difference is statistically significant at the 11%
level.
The improvement in measurement accuracy comes from all cohorts, with the
strongest effect from the 2000 cohort. The evidence is consistent with the idea that
higher economic interests leads to higher visibility and better monitoring effects.
2.5.3.2 End-user Interest
The energy sector is the most important set of end-users of weather derivative
products. Cities with high demand for energy are, therefore, likely to have relatively
higher interest in weather derivative products. We exploit this heterogeneity across
weather derivative cities to provide further support for our main claim that when
economic interests are high, there is a higher improvement in measurement accuracy.
We take a city’s population as a proxy for its energy demand. If a city falls among
the top 25 population cities in the U.S., then we classify it as a high energy demand
location for our empirical test. Further, consistent with the analysis of the previous
section, if a city gets a derivative contract in the first two waves (1999 and 2000),
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we consider it as a high demand station as well. We create an indicator variable
High Demand that equals one if the weather derivative station falls among the top 25
population cities or belongs to the early cohort. We similarly create another indicator
variable Low Demand that equals One minus High Demand. There are six cities
in the Low Demand category: cities that received their derivative contract in later
cohorts and are among the low energy demand places. We expect these cities to have
relatively lower economic interests and market scrutiny as compared to the remaining
treatment cities in the sample. Our test is designed to pick up these differences in
market scrutiny on the measurement outcomes.
We estimate our main regression model after including High Demand and Low
Demand variables separately in the model. Results are provided in Table B.6. We
find that the improvements are concentrated in the subset of high demand cities.
The coefficient estimate on High Demand variable is almost four times larger: -2.22
as compared to -0.66 for Low Demand. The difference is significant at the 6% level. In
the log specification, the estimated coefficient on the High Demand variable is almost
twice as large as the coefficient on Low Demand. The difference in these coefficients is
statistically significant at a p-value of 0.11. Overall these results are consistent with
the notion that measurement outcomes improve with economic interests and market
scrutiny.
[Table B.6 Here]
2.5.3.3 Effort versus Technology
We have shown that the introduction of financial markets improves the actions
of the NWS by bringing more visibility and scrutiny of the reported temperature
numbers. We now focus on the sources of improvement. In particular, there are two
possible, not mutually exclusive, channels of improvement. First, the NWS might
install better thermometers or sensors at these stations precisely at the time when
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derivatives start trading. We call this the technology channel. Second, the NWS
officers might put forth more effort to better capture the temperature data in an
accurate manner after contract introduction. We call this the effort channel. While
the net effect of both these channels remains the same, i.e., an improvement in the
measurement of weather, our focus is more on the second channel. Said differently, we
want to investigate the disciplining effect of market purely on account of higher effort
put in by the government officials. These improvements can come through better
maintenance and monitoring of the weather stations to minimize erroneous reports.
One of the most important recent changes in the NWS’s temperature measurement
technology was the installation of Automated Surface Observing Systems (ASOS).
Although the NWS consistently upgrades these stations, the installation of ASOS
was the most important event on the technology side of temperature measurement.
We collected data on the ASOS installation dates for 48 out of 49 weather stations
in our sample.27 For each one of these stations, the ASOS was commissioned before
September 1999. This rules out the possibility of any major change in measurement
technology for weather derivative stations just after the introduction of the derivative
contract. In addition, we correlate the year of introduction of ASOS with an indicator
variable that equals one for the treatment group, and zero for the control group.
The correlation coefficient is almost zero. Thus, we do not find any evidence that
derivative stations in our sample get better and/or earlier technology from the NWS
as compared to the control stations.
We empirically separate the effort and technology channels by exploiting an im-
portant cross-sectional variation in trading activities across calendar months in the
weather derivatives market. This test also allows us to strengthen our claim that
economic interests drive more accurate measurement. As mentioned earlier, the end-
users of the weather derivatives market are typically sectors such as utilities, farming,
27The data for the Los Angeles Station is not available.
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transportation, retail, and food products. A majority of their hedging demands arise
in the months with higher levels of heat or cold. Not surprising, an overwhelm-
ing majority of these contracts are based in peak summer and peak winter months
(see Figure B.5). This leaves the months of April and October as the least traded
months on the exchange. We estimate the basic regression model separately for these
two months and the rest of the year. The key idea is to assess the improvement in
measurement efforts keeping the underlying measurement technology the same.
[Figure B.5 Here]
We aggregate all the error days in April and October for the first analysis and
similarly the error days in the remaining months for the second analysis. Results are
provided in Columns (1) and (2) of Table B.7, respectively. Examining Column 1, we
find no improvement in October and April, whereas there is significant improvement
in the active trading months. In an additional test, we separate the sample into two
groups by clubbing ±1 month around April and October in one group, and the rest in
another. Thus we have exactly six months in each group. As shown in Columns (3)
and (4) of the Table, we find negative coefficients for both groups, but the coefficient
is significant only for the peak months. Further, the coefficient for the peak months’
sub-sample is more than double the off-peak months’ regression coefficient. Thus
even at the same station, the improvement comes from months with active trading
interest. These are the months where the pressure and monitoring from the outside
market is likely to be the highest. In these months, the frequency of follow ups with
the NWS stations and analysis of the weather data by the trading professionals is
expected to be higher than the remaining months. Our result supports the view that
financial markets induce higher effort by the stations in measuring the temperature
accurately.
[Table B.7 Here]
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2.5.3.4 Station Maintenance
In this section we provide some direct evidence on actions undertaken by the
NWS in improving weather measurement. We investigate the frequency of mainte-
nance performed by NWS officers at the weather stations before and after the launch
of derivative instruments. MDA Inc, our data vendor, maintains a list of major main-
tenance operations for all the derivative trading stations since the year 2003. Similar
data for the control stations is not available.28 Since the data is available for only the
trading stations, we are only able to exploit the cross-sectional variation within these
stations. Following the variable definition in Section 2.5.3.2, we create an indicator
variable called High Demand. High Demand equals one for stations with potentially
higher economic interest in weather derivative products after the introduction of the
derivative contract. We analyze the difference in maintenance frequency across the
low and high demand categories of derivative stations using the same empirical design
as in in our base case estimates.
These maintenance operations are performed only occasionally. Most maintenance
operations include fixing and recalibrating sensors that have been corroded, damaged
or failed. We create a variable called Maintenance that equals the number of days
a maintenance was performed at the station. We use its log transformed value in
the regression model to avoid the impact of outliers. As an alternative measure, we
create an indicator variable, Any Maintenance, that equals one for that station-year
observation if there is any maintenance during the year, and zero otherwise. Results
are provided in Table B.8. In Models 2 and 4, we include year fixed effects and in
all Models we include station fixed effects. Since we use station fixed effects, this
estimation exploits changes in maintenance frequency for stations with derivative
introduction in either 2005 and 2008 only. Despite this data limitation, we find
28The non-availability of maintenance data for the control stations is consistent with our basic
assertion that market players pay relatively higher attention to the performance of stations with
weather contracts.
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that stations with higher demand of derivative products perform more maintenance
after the derivative launch as compared to their low demand stations. Based on
the coefficient estimate of Model 2 in the Table, high demand stations perform 1.40
times higher maintenance than their low demand counterparts. Overall these results
provide evidence in support of one potential channel of higher effort to measure
the temperature numbers correctly. In addition to the maintenance channel, the
weather measurement outcomes can be improved through channels such as better
monitoring of the stations and proper calibration of sensors. While we are unable
to directly document the role of all these channels in our empirical analysis, our
overall evidence supports the view that the introduction of financial contracts leads
to efficient outcomes.
[Table B.8 Here]
2.5.4 Robustness Tests
2.5.4.1 NCDC Cleaned Values
All our results so far have been based on the difference between a third-party
(MDA) certified measure of clean data and the NWS raw data for a station’s tem-
perature. We also obtain the corrected or restated data produced by an affiliated
government agency of the NWS, namely the NCDC. The NCDC is responsible for
producing the government’s final data after removing measurement errors by the
station. These cleaned data become NOAA’s official data and are widely used in
meteorological studies.
We begin with all 49 stations in our sample. However, we do not have high
quality NCDC data for the year 1999. In addition, the agency did not produce
corrected values for two control stations (San Jose and Riverside) during our sample
period. Hence, we lose the year 1999 and two control stations from the sample. Also,
the NCDC did not produce corrected values for 8 stations in December 2001, so
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we lose one observation month for this part of the study. We re-estimate our main
regression models based on the NCDC data and report the results in Table B.9. As
can be seen from the Table, the results are almost identical to the ones reported
using MDA values. These results provide confidence in our measure of temperature
accuracy since data from both these parties – MDA, a third-party private company,
and NCDC, an affiliated government agency – produce similar results. Their broad
agreement on the cleaned or correct temperature value alleviates the concern that we
might have a bad measure of temperature accuracy. Indeed, on the set of overlapping
observations, common to both MDA and NCDC, we find that they agree on the
correct temperature values in almost all cases. There are only 4 instances out of over
200,000 daily observations where there is a disagreement between the two agencies
about the correct temperature value. Therefore, it is not surprising that we get almost
identical results using either one of these measures.
[Table B.9 Here]
2.5.4.2 Controlling for Changes in Weather Condition
It is unlikely that weather conditions become more conducive to better measure-
ment outcomes after the launch of derivative contracts in a city. If that were not
the case, then an improvement in measurement accuracy could simply be an artifact
of changes in weather condition itself. To rule out this possibility, we re-estimate
our main empirical model after including the volatility of annual temperature and
the level of temperature as additional explanatory variables in the model. The key
idea is to separate out the effect of volatile weather conditions or changes in average
temperature from the main effect that we are interested in. Results are produced
in Table B.10. The coefficient on derivative remains negative and significant. In
fact the inclusion of these two variables does not change the magnitude of estimated
coefficient in any meaningful manner as compared to our base case estimate.
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[Table B.10 Here]
2.6 Conclusion
We show that the launch of a weather derivatives market on a city’s temperature
results in more accurate temperature measurement by the dedicated weather station
for that city. After the launch of these contracts, the NWS reported numbers become
reference points for billions of dollars of contracts in the private market. Thus there
is an increased interest and monitoring of these numbers by third parties, which in
turn creates more pressure on the NWS to produce better measures. The increased
pressure can come in the form of potential reputational loss or the possibility of future
disputes among the contracting parties.
Our results highlight an important role of financial markets. They can work
as a disciplining device even in the absence of explicit incentives and monitoring
mechanisms that are present in the corporate settings. Here, the numbers reported
by a government agency become more accurate after the markets open up. To the
extent that we care about accurate measurement of these numbers, there is a positive
externality that comes from the financial markets. Indeed there are several industries,
most notably the energy sector, that directly benefit from high frequency accurate
data. Overall, our study provides one of the first empirical estimates of the impact of
financial innovations on the real outcomes produced by parties that are not directly
affected by the payoffs from the contract.
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APPENDIX A
Financial Sector Stress and Asset Prices: Evidence
from the Weather Derivatives Market
A.1 Estimating Risk Premiums
The risk premium for each contract is calculated as follows:
rimdy =
E[Payoffimdy]
Priceimdy
− (1 + rf ) (A.1)
where rimdy is the risk premium on the location i, month m, degree day index d
and year y contract, E[Payoffimdy] is the model-based expected payoff, Priceimdy is
the price of the contract and rf is the monthly risk-free rate for month m and year
y. I use the contract price 32 days from contract maturity and calculate expected
payoffs based on information 32 days from maturity. The maturity date is defined as
the last day of the contract’s specified month. The closer to contract maturity, the
more realized temperatures are embedded in the price and the less risk that needs to
be hedged. The further away from contract maturity, the fewer open contracts. 32
days was chosen as a trade-off between the amount of contracts with prices and the
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amount of information in prices. This also allows for a discussion of the risk premium
as approximately a monthly risk premium.
To estimate the expected payoff I model the average daily temperature process
for each location following Bellini (2005) and Dornier and Querel (2000). The tem-
perature process for each location is a generalized Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process:
dT (t) =
dθ(t)
dt
+ e−κ[θ(t)− T (t)]dt+ σ(t)dW (t) (A.2)
where T (t) is the temperature on day t, θ(t) is the moving average, κ is the mean
reversion parameter, σ(t) is the standard deviation of temperature on day t and W (t)
is a Brownian motion. Dornier and Querel (2000) show that dθ(t)
dt
is necessary for the
model to tend towards the historical mean.1 The mean, θ(t), and standard deviation,
σ(t), of temperature vary with the day of the year:
Mean Temperature = θ(t) = β0 + δt+
P∑
p=1
βp sin(
2pi
365
pt+ φp) (A.3)
Std. Dev. of Temperature = σ(t) = γ0 +
Q∑
q=1
γp sin(
2pi
365
qt+ ψp) (A.4)
where β0 (γ0) captures the average expected (standard variation of) temperature of a
location during the year, P (Q) is the number of sinusoidal functions, βp (γq) governs
the magnitude of the seasonal movements and φp (ψq) is the phase parameter, which
shifts the seasonal variation so the peak and trough of the sinusoidal curve align with
the peak and trough of temperature (standard deviation of temperature) during the
year. δt captures any long-run trend in temperature such as global warming. P or
Q equal to 1 captures annual seasonality, P or Q equal to 2 captures semi-annual
seasonality, etc. By allowing for P > 1 and Q > 1, I allow for seasonality at shorter
1The equation for dθ(t)dt is:
dθ(t)
dt = δ +
∑P
p=1
2pi
365pβp cos(
2pi
365pt+ φp)
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than annual frequencies.
Bellini (2005) shows that the continuous process in equation A.2 can be repre-
sented in discrete-time as an AR(1) process:
T (t) = ρT (t− 1)− ρθ(t− 1) + θ(t) + s(t)(t) (A.5)
where ρ = e−κ, (t) is distributed N(0, 1) and s(t) is:
s2(t) =
t∫
t−1
e−2κ(t−u)σ2(u)du (A.6)
I use maximum likelihood estimation to estimate the parameters for each location
separately. I estimate the model using temperature realizations from January 1, 1999
to January 31, 2012. I estimate a maximum likelihood function, where the conditional
likelihood of each temperature observation is:
f(T (t)|T (t− 1),Θ) = (2piσ2(t))− 12 e− 12σ2(t) (T (t)−θ(t)−ρ(T (t−1)−θ(t−1)))2 (A.7)
The maximum log-likelihood function is:
ln L(Θ|{T}Nt=2) = −
N − 1
2
ln 2pi − 1
2
N∑
t=2
ln σ2(t)
−1
2
N∑
t=2
1
σ2(t)
(T (t)− θ(t)− ρ(T (t− 1)− θ(t− 1)))2
(A.8)
I maximize the likelihood for each city separately. I maximize the log-likelihood
function for P={1,2,3,4} and Q={1,2,3,4}. To choose the optimal P and Q, I step
through the P-Q grid by calculating the likelihood of the model with an additional P
and the likelihood of the model with an additional Q and step towards the function
with the greatest improvement. A step is only taken if the LR-test statistic between
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the alternative and null models has a p-value less than or equal to 10%. I limit P
and Q to a maximum of 4 for ease of calculation and simplification. This should not
affect the results presented in the paper.
The resulting parameter estimates are presented in Table A.12. The mean re-
version parameter (κ) has a mean value of .33, which corresponds to a ρ = e−κ of
.72. The speed of mean reversion is inversely related to κ, so Colorado Springs and
Boston have the slowest speed of reversion, while the warmer climates (Los Angeles,
Las Vegas, Tucson) have the fastest mean reversion. In Column 3, I present the
amount of long-term drift in temperature (µ0). The parameter can be interpreted as
the yearly increase in the mean temperature for each location (I present the drift term
multiplied by 365). The mean drift is greater than 0 and ranges between .000 and
.004. There appears to be a modest amount of warming over time at 21 of the 24 lo-
cations, although I do not test for the significance of these parameters. The long-run
mean temperature (β0) varies as expected across cities. Houston and Tucson have the
highest estimates with mean temperatures just greater than 70, while Minneapolis
and Colorado Springs have the lowest estimates with mean temperatures slightly less
than 50. The magnitude of seasonality in temperature is captured by parameter β1.
The least “seasonal” location is Los Angeles with a β1 equal to 8.04, much lower
than the estimates for other cities. The most “seasonal” locations are Kansas City,
Chicago and Salt Lake City with estimates slightly greater than 24. As discussed in
the previous paragraph, additional sine functions are added when the introduction
of the additional parameters is significant at the 10% level. When P=2, there is an
additional sine function that captures semi-annual variation in mean temperatures.
There is significant semi-annual variation in temperature in 19 of the 24 cities. For 9
cities, there is significant variation in mean temperature at the tri-annual frequency.
Turning to the parameters for the standard deviation process, the estimates for the
mean level of variation (γ0) align with expectations. Locations in the Southwest (Los
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Angeles, Las Vegas, Tucson and Sacramento) have parameter estimates less than 4,
while some locations in the midwest (Chicago, Cincinnati, Kansas City and Min-
neapolis) have parameter estimates greater than 6. All but 2 locations have at least
2 significant seasonal frequencies in the standard deviation (Q ≥ 2), 7 have at least
3 and Tucson has 4 seasonal frequencies in the standard deviation.2
[Table A.12 Here]
After the temperature process has been estimated, I calculate expected payoffs by
using the temperature realization 32 days before contract maturity and simulating 500
temperature paths over the next 32 days until contract maturity. From the simulated
temperatures, I apply the HDD and CDD temperature formulas to calculate the payoff
of the contract for each path. The expected payoff is the average of the simulated
contract payoffs.
2My estimates for the optimal P and Q vary slightly from Bellini’s (2005) estimates. She esti-
mates parameters for 4 cities: Chicago, Philadelphia, Portland and Tucson. Her estimated P and
Q were (2,3) for Chicago, (1,3) for Philadelphia, (2,3) for Portland and (5,3) for Tucson. The dis-
crepancies are most likely due to estimating over different sample periods and different criteria for
increasing P and Q.
76
A.2 Temperature Outcomes
[Table A.13 Here]
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A.3 Systematic Risk Results
[Table A.14 Here]
[Table A.15 Here]
A.4 Figures
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Figure A.1: Sample of June CDD Contracts
This figure shows the average logarithm of the contract price 32 days before maturity
(Average Price), the average logarithm of the contract settlement value at maturity
(Average Payoff at Maturity) and the average logarithm of the contract price 32 days
before maturity during the crisis (Crisis Price) for three June cooling degree day
contracts (Chicago, Kansas City and New York). Averages are taken over the years
2000-2012.
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Figure A.2: Average Price and Open Interest for February HDD Contracts
This figure shows the average price and open interest (32 days before maturity) for
February HDD contracts from 2000 to 2011.
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Figure A.3: Estimated Mean Temperature vs. Average Temperature
I plot the estimated mean temperature (θt) and the average temperature for each day
of the year for Chicago, Houston, New York and Philadelphia. The parameters of
the mean temperature process are estimated separately for each city. The average
temperature is calculated over the period from January 1, 1999 to January 31, 2012.
The discrete time representation of the temperature process is an AR(1) process with
time-varying mean temperature and time-varying standard deviation of temperature:
T (t) = e−κ[T (t−1)−θ(t−1)]+θ(t)+s(t)(t), where θ(t) = β0+δt+
∑P
p=1 βp sin(
2pi
365
pt+
φp) and σ(t) = γ0 +
∑Q
q=1 γp sin(
2pi
365
qt+ ψp)
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Figure A.4: NOAA’s Temperature Forecasts from the CPC Monthly & Seasonal Fore-
cast Archive.
Oct.-Dec. 2008 Jan.-Mar. 2009
Apr.-Jun. 2009 Jul.-Sep. 2009
Oct.-Dec. 2009
These maps give NOAA’s three month temperature outlook for the United States.
The maps are from the 18th of the month before the start of the three month period.
A stands for a higher probability of above normal temperatures, EC stands for an
equal chance of above, normal or below normal temperatures, and B stands for a
higher probability of below normal temperatures.
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Figure A.5: Monthly Open Interest
This figure shows the total open interest (maximum open interest during trading
period summed across contracts) by contract year-month.
A.5 Tables
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Table A.2: Summary Statistics for Open Interest, Contract Risk Premiums and Re-
alized Returns
This table presents summary statistics for contract open interest measured 32
days before contract maturity, the model implied risk premiums and realized
returns. Contracts are grouped by heating degree day index contracts (HDD),
cooling degree day index contracts (CDD) and all contracts (All). I present the
mean (Mean), standard deviation (Std. Dev.), 10th percentile (10th), median
(Median), 90th percentile (90th) and the number of observations (N). Each
observation is a location-month-index-year.
Open Interest
Index Mean Std. Dev. 10th Median 90th N
CDD 282 512 20 120 700 475
HDD 202 348 10 97 500 629
All 236 428 12 100 550 1,104
Risk Premiums (Monthly %)
Index Mean Std. Dev. 10th Median 90th N
CDD 0.50 12.15 -13.33 -0.32 15.74 475
HDD -0.10 10.86 -12.35 -0.93 13.32 629
All 0.16 11.43 -12.55 -0.79 14.10 1,104
Realized Returns (Monthly %)
Index Mean Std. Dev. 10th Median 90th N
CDD -0.14 28.56 -33.02 -0.64 32.21 475
HDD -1.79 18.64 -23.44 -1.24 17.62 629
All -1.08 23.43 -25.93 -1.17 21.84 1,104
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Table A.3: Summary Statistics for Margin Requirements and Coefficients of Variation
This table presents summary statistics for contract margin requirements and
coefficients of variation. Contracts are grouped by heating degree day index
contracts (HDD), cooling degree day index contracts (CDD) and all contracts
(All). I present the mean (Mean), standard deviation (Std. Dev.), 10th per-
centile (10th), median (Median), 90th percentile (90th) and the number of
observations (N). Each observation is a location-month-index-year.
Maintenance Margin (%)
Index Mean Std. Dev. 10th Median 90th N
CDD 7.15 2.96 4.00 7.00 11.00 475
HDD 5.16 1.31 4.00 4.80 8.00 629
All 6.01 2.39 4.00 5.20 9.00 1,104
Coefficient of Variation
Index Mean Std. Dev. 10th Median 90th N
CDD 0.28 0.16 0.12 0.26 0.45 475
HDD 0.22 0.10 0.14 0.20 0.31 629
All 0.25 0.13 0.14 0.21 0.41 1,104
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Table A.4: The Effect of Financial Sector Stress on Risk Premiums
This table reports the main regression results. The regression
model is:
WRPimdy = β ∗ FinancialCrisismy + δimd + imdy,
The dependent variable is the weather risk premium for
location i, month m, degree day index d and year y.
FinancialCrisismy is an indicator variable equal to 1 dur-
ing the time period when financial institutions were under
stress (October 2008 to December 2009). δimd is the contract
fixed effect for the contract on location i, month m and index
d. R-squared is the within contract r-squared. The regression
results presented in Column 1 includes all contracts. The re-
gression in Column 2 (3) includes only CDD (HDD) contracts.
Standard errors are clustered at the year-month level.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES WRP-All WRP-CDD WRP-HDD
Financial Crisis 3.340** 7.968** 1.620
(1.632) (2.994) (1.761)
Observations 1,104 475 629
R-squared 0.016 0.051 0.005
Number of Contracts 207 90 117
Contract Dummies Yes Yes Yes
HDD contracts Yes No Yes
CDD contracts Yes Yes No
Standard Errors Clustered by Year-Month in Parentheses
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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Table A.5: Margins
This table reports the regression results examining the effect
of margin requirements on risk premiums during a period of
financial sector sector stress. The regression model is:
WRPimdy = β ∗ FinancialCrisismy + βmar ∗Marginimd ∗
FinancialCrisismy + δimd + imdy,
The dependent variable is the weather risk premium for
location i, month m, degree day index d and year y.
FinancialCrisismy is an indicator variable equal to 1 during
the time period when financial institutions were under stress
(October 2008 to December 2009). Marginimd is the main-
tenance margin requirement for the contract on location i,
month m and index d. δimd is the contract fixed effect for the
contract on location i, month m and index d. R-squared is the
within contract r-squared. Column 1 includes all contracts.
The regression in Column 2 (3) includes only CDD (HDD)
contracts. Standard errors are clustered at the year-month
level.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES WRP-All WRP-CDD WRP-HDD
Financial Crisis -12.12*** -8.222 -16.03***
(3.746) (5.525) (4.673)
Margin*Financial Crisis 2.661*** 2.192** 3.378***
(0.650) (0.848) (0.961)
Observations 1,104 475 629
R-squared 0.068 0.089 0.051
Number of Contracts 207 90 117
Contract Dummies Yes Yes Yes
HDD contracts Yes No Yes
CDD contracts Yes Yes No
Standard Errors Clustered by Year-Month in Parentheses
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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Table A.6: Contract Risk
This table reports the regression results examining the effect
of contract risk on risk premiums during a period of financial
stress. The regression model is:
WRPimdy = β ∗ FinancialCrisismy
+βcv ∗ CVimd ∗ FinancialCrisismy + δimd + imdy,
The dependent variable is the weather risk premium for
location i, month m, degree day index d and year y.
FinancialCrisismy is an indicator variable equal to 1 during
the time period when financial institutions were under stress
(October 2008 to December 2009). CVimd is the coefficient
of variation of historical contract payoffs (calculated over the
years 1974-2011) for the contract on location i, month m and
index d. δimd is the contract fixed effect for location i, month
m and index d. R-squared is the within contract r-squared.
Column 1 includes all contracts. The regression in Column 2
(3) includes only CDD (HDD) contracts. Standard errors are
clustered at the year-month level.
(1) (2) (3)
VARIABLES WRP-All WRP-CDD WRP-HDD
Financial Crisis -8.725** 0.269 -12.41***
(3.761) (4.864) (3.331)
CV*Financial Crisis 51.61*** 28.83 63.37***
(16.47) (27.37) (12.10)
Observations 1,104 475 629
R-squared 0.056 0.062 0.069
Number of Contracts 207 90 117
Contract Dummies Yes Yes Yes
HDD contracts Yes No Yes
CDD contracts Yes Yes No
Standard Errors Clustered by Year-Month in Parentheses
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
89
T
ab
le
A
.7
:
M
ar
gi
n
s
&
C
on
tr
ac
t
R
is
k
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
or
ts
re
su
lt
s
fo
r
re
gr
es
si
on
s
ex
a
m
in
in
g
th
e
eff
ec
t
o
f
co
n
tr
a
ct
ri
sk
a
n
d
m
a
rg
in
re
q
u
ir
em
en
ts
o
n
ri
sk
p
re
m
iu
m
s
d
u
ri
n
g
a
p
er
io
d
of
fi
n
an
ci
al
se
ct
or
st
re
ss
.
T
h
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
m
o
d
el
is
:
W
R
P
im
d
y
=
β
∗F
in
a
n
ci
a
lC
ri
si
s m
y
+
β
c
v
∗C
V
im
d
∗F
in
a
n
ci
a
lC
ri
si
s m
y
+
β
m
a
r
∗M
a
rg
in
im
d
∗F
in
a
n
ci
a
lC
ri
si
s m
y
+
β
in
t
∗C
V
im
d
∗M
a
rg
in
im
d
∗F
in
a
n
ci
a
lC
ri
si
s m
y
+
δ i
m
d
+
 i
m
d
y
,
T
h
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
va
ri
ab
le
is
th
e
w
ea
th
er
ri
sk
p
re
m
iu
m
fo
r
lo
ca
ti
o
n
i,
m
o
n
th
m
,
d
eg
re
e
d
ay
in
d
ex
d
a
n
d
ye
a
r
y
.
C
ri
si
s m
y
is
a
n
in
d
ic
at
or
va
ri
ab
le
eq
u
al
to
1
d
u
ri
n
g
th
e
ti
m
e
p
er
io
d
w
h
en
fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l
in
st
it
u
ti
o
n
s
w
er
e
u
n
d
er
st
re
ss
.
M
a
rg
in
im
d
is
th
e
m
a
in
te
n
a
n
ce
m
ar
gi
n
fo
r
th
e
co
n
tr
ac
t
on
lo
ca
ti
on
i,
m
o
n
th
m
a
n
d
in
d
ex
d
.
C
V
im
d
is
th
e
co
effi
ci
en
t
o
f
va
ri
a
ti
o
n
o
f
h
is
to
ri
ca
l
co
n
tr
a
ct
p
ay
o
ff
s
(c
al
cu
la
te
d
ov
er
th
e
ye
ar
s
19
74
-2
01
1)
fo
r
th
e
co
n
tr
a
ct
o
n
lo
ca
ti
o
n
i,
m
o
n
th
m
a
n
d
in
d
ex
d
.
δ i
m
d
is
th
e
co
n
tr
a
ct
fi
x
ed
eff
ec
t
fo
r
lo
ca
ti
on
i,
m
on
th
m
an
d
in
d
ex
d
.
T
h
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
C
o
lu
m
n
s
1
&
2
in
cl
u
d
e
a
ll
co
n
tr
a
ct
s.
T
h
e
re
g
re
ss
io
n
s
in
C
o
lu
m
n
s
3
&
4
(5
&
6)
ar
e
ru
n
fo
r
C
D
D
(H
D
D
)
co
n
tr
ac
ts
.
S
ta
n
d
a
rd
er
ro
rs
a
re
cl
u
st
er
ed
a
t
th
e
y
ea
r-
m
o
n
th
le
ve
l.
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
V
A
R
IA
B
L
E
S
W
R
P
-A
ll
W
R
P
-A
ll
W
R
P
-C
D
D
W
R
P
-C
D
D
W
R
P
-H
D
D
W
R
P
-H
D
D
F
in
an
ci
al
C
ri
si
s
-1
4.
18
**
*
-0
.1
09
-8
.4
04
*
0.
39
8
-1
6
.1
3
*
*
*
2
2
.4
8
*
*
(3
.6
50
)
(7
.6
18
)
(4
.5
02
)
(7
.1
04
)
(4
.7
4
2
)
(1
0
.8
8
)
M
ar
g
in
*
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
C
ri
si
s
1.
95
5*
*
-0
.5
12
2.
15
8*
0.
67
5
1.
2
9
3
-4
.9
5
5
*
*
*
(0
.8
09
)
(1
.3
28
)
(1
.1
68
)
(1
.4
58
)
(1
.2
2
9
)
(1
.7
8
0
)
C
V
*
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
C
ri
si
s
26
.3
4
-2
4.
25
1.
60
3
-2
7.
12
4
9.
6
4
*
*
*
-1
2
4
.3
*
*
(1
8.
70
)
(3
5.
17
)
(2
7.
54
)
(4
0.
54
)
(1
7
.0
9
)
(4
8
.6
6
)
C
V
*
M
ar
g
in
*
F
in
a
n
ci
a
l
C
ri
si
s
8.
09
9*
4.
50
8
2
6
.3
0
*
*
*
(4
.1
26
)
(4
.0
87
)
(5
.8
9
8
)
O
b
se
rv
a
ti
on
s
1,
10
4
1,
10
4
47
5
47
5
6
2
9
6
2
9
R
-s
q
u
a
re
d
0.
07
4
0.
08
0
0.
08
9
0.
09
1
0.
0
7
2
0
.0
9
7
N
u
m
b
er
of
C
o
n
tr
ac
ts
20
7
20
7
90
90
1
1
7
1
1
7
C
on
tr
a
ct
D
u
m
m
ie
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
H
D
D
co
n
tr
ac
ts
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
N
o
Y
es
Y
es
C
D
D
co
n
tr
a
ct
s
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
Y
es
N
o
N
o
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
E
rr
or
s
C
lu
st
er
ed
b
y
Y
ea
r-
M
on
th
in
P
ar
en
th
es
es
**
*
p
<
0.
01
**
p
<
0.
05
*
p
<
0.
1
90
Table A.8: Normal and Financial Stress Periods
This table reports regression results examining the effect of contract risk and
margin requirements on weather risk premiums over the full sample, in the
crisis and outside of the crisis period. The regression model is:
WRPimdy = β ∗Ximd + δm + imdy,
where the dependent variable is the weather risk premium for location i, month
m, degree day index d and year y, Ximd is either Marginimd or CVimd, and
δm is a contract month fixed effect. Marginimd is the maintenance margin for
the contract on location i, month m and index d. CVimd is the coefficient of
variation of historical contract payoffs (calculated over the years 1974-2011)
for the contract on location i, month m and index d. Margin (contract risk)
results are reported in Columns 1-3 (4-6). In Columns 1 and 4, regressions
are run on the entire sample period (labeled “Entire”). In Columns 2 and 5,
regressions are run on time periods outside of the stress period (all months
except those from October 2008 to December 2009; labeled “Normal”). In
Columns 3 and 6, regressions are run on observations during the financial
stress time period (October 2008 to December 2009; labeled “Crisis”) All
regressions include both HDD and CDD contracts. R-squared is the within
contract r-squared. Standard errors are clustered at the year-month level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Entire Normal Crisis Entire Normal Crisis
Margin 0.0520 -0.317 2.233***
(0.228) (0.215) (0.512)
CV 7.079 0.383 28.68***
(6.253) (7.419) (8.475)
Observations 1,104 940 164 1,104 940 164
R-squared 0.074 0.068 0.458 0.078 0.064 0.418
HDD contracts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CDD contracts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors Clustered by Location-Index in Parentheses
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
91
Table A.9: Collapsed Markets
This table reports results for probit regressions examining the probability the
market for a contract collapsed during the crisis period. The regression model
is:
P (Collapsed = 1) =
Φ(βm ∗Marginimd + βCV ∗ CVimd + βInt ∗ CVimd ∗Marginimd),
The dependent variable is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the contract for
location i, month m, degree day index d and year y traded in the 12 months
preceding the distress, but not in the 12 months post-distress. Marginimd is
the maintenance margin for the contract on location i, month m and index d.
CVimd is the coefficient of variation of historical contract payoffs (calculated
over the years 1974-2011) for the contract on location i, month m and index
d. All regressions include both HDD and CDD contracts. Standard errors are
clustered by month.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed Collapsed
Margin 0.119* 0.0597 0.103
(0.0669) (0.0670) (0.103)
CV 2.539** 2.023 3.016**
(1.098) (1.262) (1.501)
CV*Margin -0.137
(0.221)
Observations 136 136 136 136
Pseudo R-squared 0.0432 0.0667 0.0747 0.0759
Standard Errors Clustered by Month in Parentheses
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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The dependent variable is the negative of the logarithm of the contract price 32
days before contract maturity (−log(Price)). Financial Crisis is an indicator vari-
able equal to 1 during the time period when financial institutions were under stress
(October 2008 to December 2009). CV*Financial Crisis is an interaction between the
coefficient of variation of the relevant monthly degree day index and Financial Crisis.
Margin*Financial Crisis is an interaction between the contract’s margin requirement
and Financial Crisis. Log(Settle) is the logarithm of the price of the contract on the
settlement date. Last Month is the logarithm of the relevant index in the previous
month for a specific location. Risk-Free Rate is the risk-free rate of return. All re-
gressions are standard OLS regressions. All regressions include contract fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at the year-month level. R-squared is the within con-
tract r-squared. Columns 1 and 4 include all contracts. Regressions in columns 2 &
5 (3 & 6) are run on the CDD (HDD) contracts only.
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Table A.14: Systematic Risk By Location
This table reports results for CAPM-style regressions of the form:
Rp −Rf = β ∗ (Rm −Rf ) + δm,
where Rp is the “physical” return, Rf is the monthly risk-free rate and δm is a
month fixed effect. Rp is calculated as follows:
Payoff
E[Payoff ] − 1, where Payoff is the
realized degree index value and E[Payoff ] is the expected payoff calculated 32 days
before maturity based on the temperature model. Regressions are run separately
for each location. The sample contains all months from February 1999 to January
2012. Only those location-month-indices that had a contract based on the specific
index trade at least once from September 1999 to January 2012 are included in
the sample. For months in which HDD and CDD contracts trade, I include only
the index with the highest E[Payoff ] for each location-month. The CAPM β is
reported in the column labeled β. The regression constant is reported in the column
labeled “Constant” (note: this is not the CAPM α, as the regressions include month
fixed effects. Standard errors calculated using Huber-White sandwich estimators
are reported in parentheses in the column to the right of the coefficient. N is the
number of observations and R-squared is the regression r-squared. All regressions
are standard OLS regressions.
WBAN β s.e. α s.e. N R-squared
Dallas -0.43 (0.48) -2.52 (2.00) 156 0.06
Kansas City -0.72 (0.43) -0.08 (2.07) 156 0.05
Houston -0.09 (0.61) -1.64 (2.16) 156 0.03
Philadelphia -0.88 ** (0.38) -0.40 (1.86) 156 0.14
Atlanta -1.04 ** (0.50) 1.01 (2.01) 156 0.12
New York -0.76 ** (0.38) -0.75 (1.77) 156 0.18
Boston -0.95 * (0.50) -0.54 (2.27) 156 0.08
Minneapolis -1.40 ** (0.61) -1.48 (2.48) 156 0.09
Des Moines -0.95 ** (0.39) -1.23 1.91 156 0.09
Tucscon -0.37 (0.53) -1.52 (1.95) 156 0.08
Las Vegas 1.00 * (0.55) -0.09 (2.52) 156 0.07
Sacramento 0.77 (0.48) 2.93 (2.42) 156 0.07
Salt Lake City -0.50 (0.43) -1.15 (2.54) 52 0.14
Portland 1.75 * (1.01) 10.85 ** (5.26) 156 0.27
Baltimore -0.60 (0.40) -1.46 (1.74) 91 0.11
Cincinnati -0.86 ** (0.42) -0.35 (2.08) 156 0.08
Chicago -1.30 *** (0.49) 1.46 (2.28) 156 0.07
Detroit -0.90 *** (0.33) -0.06 (1.81) 117 0.09
Mean -0.46 * (0.23) 0.17 (0.70) 144 -
Correlation(WRPi,βˆi) = -.09, p-value=.73
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Table A.15: Systematic Risk and Stress
This table reports results for regressions examining the effect of contract risk, margin
requirement and the location CAPM beta on weather risk premiums during a period
of financial stress. The regression model is:
WRPimdy = β ∗ Crisismy + βX ∗Ximd ∗ Crisismy + βbeta ∗Betai ∗ Crisismy +
βint ∗Ximd ∗Betai ∗ Crisismy + δimd + imdy,
The dependent variable is the weather risk premium for location i, month m, degree
day index d and year y. Crisismy is an indicator variable equal to 1 during the
time period when financial institutions were under stress. Ximd is either the margin
requirement or coefficient of variation for the contract on location i, month m and
index d. Betai is the CAPM beta for location i. δimd is the contract fixed effect
for location i, month m and index d. All regressions include both HDD and CDD
contracts. R-squared is the within contract r-squared. Standard errors are clustered
at the year-month level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
VARIABLES WRP WRP WRP WRP WRP
Financial Crisis 3.678** -12.71*** -12.53*** -8.523** -9.859***
(1.640) (3.293) (3.451) (3.592) (3.210)
Beta*Financial Crisis 0.608 -0.659 2.674 0.317 -3.117
(1.147) (1.024) (2.251) (1.076) (3.001)
Margin*Financial Crisis 2.700*** 2.718***
(0.626) (0.633)
Beta*Margin*Financial Crisis -0.533
(0.397)
CV*Financial Crisis 51.50*** 57.26***
(16.36) (14.42)
Beta*CV*Financial Crisis 15.18
(13.96)
Observations 1,104 1,104 1,104 1,104 1,104
R-squared 0.016 0.068 0.071 0.056 0.059
Number of Contracts 207 207 207 207 207
Contract Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
HDD contracts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
CDD contracts Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Standard Errors Clustered by Year-Month in Parentheses
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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APPENDIX B
Can Markets Discipline Government Agencies?
Evidence from the Weather Derivatives Market
B.1 Some Descriptive Evidence & Supporting Claims
In this appendix we produce pieces of evidence collected from several sources such as
the NWS directives, NOAA, weather trading industries, and atmospheric science journals
that are relevant to our study. We present some key facts and opinions from these sources
as well as our summary of the material below:
1. NWS directives on data collection exercise: NWS issues directives to its regional
offices and weather stations on a regular basis on a range of issues including data
quality control and assurance standards. Some of these directives highlight the need
for more accurate and consistent data in light of increased outside scrutiny. We
provide an example from the NWS’s directive (number NWSI 10-1305) issued on
April 28, 2008:
“The NWS has the responsibility of collecting and providing weather and climate
observation data. However, the methods for the collection, quality control, and de-
livery of these data vary from office to office. Many of the data quality initiatives
between the NWS and NCDC have been uncoordinated. Even with the NWS itself
such activities vary greatly between field offices. This situation must change in the
interest of efficiency, data record integrity and public use.
Today, with the ever increasing use of observational data by the research community,
the media, private industry, and the general public it is of the utmost importance to
accurately and consistently apply QC/QA at all field offices. In order to ensure the
highest quality data and data products within Central Region, the QC/QA methods
discussed in this supplement are highly recommended at each WFO.”
Note: Emphasis added by the authors. QC/QA stand for quality control and quality
assurance in the above quote.
2. NOAA’s information on preliminary (i.e., raw) versus official (i.e., clean) data: Below
we provide some examples of Frequently Asked Questions and their Answers from the
NOAA’s web-site about the raw versus cleaned data.
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“Are the data in NOWData considered ‘official’ for legal and other such purposes?
No. NOWData provides up-to-date information based on archived AND prelimi-
nary data holdings by NOAA. For official data, you should contact NOAAs National
Climatic Data Center or the Regional Climate Centers. NCDC provide official certi-
fication for data being used in U.S. courts.”
“I noticed that the most recent data does not match data that I found of the NCDC
web site. Why is that?
Preliminary data can be different from NCDC official data for a number of reasons
related to quality assurance and processing schedules, as well as synchronization of
the NCDC and ACIS databases. Ultimately, when processing is completed, the two
data files will match.”
Note: NOWData stands for NOAA Online Weather Data, which comes from METAR
readings, which is also our source of initial data recording.
3. A summary of the meetings between NWS and weather industry representatives:
There have been quite a few meetings between the NWS officials and the weather
derivative professionals regarding the weather derivatives market. The weather in-
dustry has often expressed its need for better quality data from the weather station.
Here is an excerpt from a meeting between NOAA staff and the representatives of
the weather derivative industry during the very early stages of this market (meeting
dated March 12, 1998).1 This meeting occurred before the launch of official CME
contracts.
“Data issues, both short and long-term, pertaining to these contracts were the im-
mediate reason for this meeting. On their own initiative, industry participants have
chosen to use daily temperature data from the National Weather Service to calculate
their cumulative degree day indices upon which the contracts are based and which
will be used to settle the contracts.
One concern they had was regarding the difference between preliminary and official
data. NOAA indicated that the preliminary data are usually quite close to the official
historical data, which are published with a lag of two to three months. With this
understanding, the firms said they felt more comfortable using the preliminary data
for initial settlement of the contracts, subject to a “true-up” to the official data several
months later.
A second interest was that there be one set of tailored data for common reference.
This could reduce disputes that might arise from different sources for the weather
data.”
4. Meridian Environmental Technology is a company specializing in atmospheric infor-
mation and technology (amongst other things). Their website provides evidence of
private enterprise’s need for accurate weather information:
“Power production planning requires accurate and reliable weather information. Merid-
ian has been providing historical and forecasted site-specific weather information to
the agriculture, transportation, and utilities industries for years. Whether you are
needing hourly, daily, weekly or longer information, Meridian can help you!
1See the full document at http://www.srh.noaa.gov/topics/attach/html/ssd98-14.htm
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We understand your needs for forecasted power production and the high penalties a
wrong estimate can cost...”2
5. NOAA’s NCDC Sectoral Engagement Fact Sheets3 document industries that depend
on quality weather information from NOAA. NOAA lists Agriculture, Civil Infras-
tructure, Coastal Hazards, Energy, Health, Insurance, Litigation, Marine and Coastal
Ecosystems, National Security, Tourism, Transportation and Water Resources as in-
dustries sensitive to the climate. Not all of these industries will be directly affected
by inaccurate temperature measurements, but some are. For example, in the Energy
Fact Sheet NOAA writes about how companies are:
“Using temperature information to aid in the assessment of equipment requirements
for heavy power line loads during extremely hot weather.”
These loads will be determined by weather measurements produced by the govern-
ment. If the numbers are incorrect, energy companies may use the incorrect amount
or type of equipment.
B.2 Figures
Figure B.1: Derivative Introduction Dates
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
New York City
Atlanta
Chicago
Cincinnati
Dallas
Des Moines
Philadelphia
Las Vegas
Portland
Tucson
Minneapolis
Boston
Kansas City
Houston
Sacramento
Baltimore
Salt Lake City
Detroit
Raleigh-Durham
Little Rock
Washington D.C.
Colorado Springs
Los Angeles
Jacksonville
10 initial
contracts
introduced
5 new
contracts
3 new
contracts
6 new
contracts
This figure shows the introduction years of U.S. weather derivatives listed on the
CME. For each year, we list the locations that received a derivative.
2http://www.meridian-enviro.com/pages.pl?pg=usf
3http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/userengagement/userengagement.html
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Figure B.2: Weather Measurement Timeline
This figure shows the timeline of initial temperature measurement by the NWS, the
corrections reported by MDA for contract settlement, and the final cleaned value
generated by NCDC.
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Figure B.3: Weather Station-Year Total Errors Distribution
This figure shows the kernel density of the total errors each year for each weather
station in our sample. We use the Gaussian kernel and a bandwidth that minimizes
the mean integrated squared error assuming the data were Gaussian.
104
Figure B.4: Average Yearly Errors Pre- and Post- Introduction
This figure graphs the average errors for the treatment and control groups before and
after weather derivative introduction. The Before period is the 3 years before intro-
duction and the After period is the year of introduction plus the 3 years afterwards.
The treatment group consists of the 14 weather stations that experienced a weather
derivative introduction after 2002 and the control group consists of the 25 stations
that never experienced a weather derivative introduction during our sample period.
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Figure B.5: Open Interest By Month
This figure plots open interest in each month during our sample. For each contract, we
calculate the maximum open interest during the contract’s trading period. We then
sum this value across all contracts that settle based on temperatures in month i during
our sample. We include all futures and option contracts of monthly durations. The
open interest data starts with the initial opening of the CME temperature derivative
market (September 22, 1999) and ends December 4, 2012.
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B.3 Tables
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Table B.2: Summary Statistics for Total Weather Station Errors
This table presents summary statistics on weather station
errors. Each observation is a weather station-year. The 49
stations consist of the 24 weather stations underlying a CME
temperature contract and 25 control weather stations. Year
is the year for which the summary statistics are calculated.
N is the number of weather stations in the sample during
the year. Mean and Median are the mean and median num-
ber of errors in that year, respectively. SD is the standard
deviation of the number of errors across stations during the
year. 10th and 90th are the 10th and 90th percentile cut-offs,
respectively.
Year N Mean Median SD 10th 90th
1999 46 11.91 11.5 5.31 6 19
2000 49 11.49 11 5.40 4 19
2001 49 11.14 10 5.30 5 19
2002 49 15.51 16 5.21 8 23
2003 49 14.45 15 6.37 5 22
2004 49 13.57 13 5.83 6 23
2005 49 11.49 11 4.74 5 17
2006 49 10.57 9 4.82 4 17
2007 49 12.73 13 5.02 7 20
2008 49 12.47 12 4.59 5 19
2009 49 10.63 10 3.89 4 15
2010 49 10.49 10 4.36 4 16
2011 49 10.71 10 4.19 5 17
All 634 12.09 12 5.23 5 20
110
Table B.3: Location Selection Probit Regression
This table presents results for a probit model of the selection of derivative
locations. The dependent variable in column 1 is a dummy variable equal to
1 if a location ever receives a derivative. The dependent variable in column 2
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a location receives a derivative in the years
1999 or 2000. Population is zero minus the population rank (-population rank)
based on 2011 metropolitan statistical area populations. Exchange is a dummy
variable equal to 1 if the city has a major commodities or financial exchange.
High Crop is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the location is the most populated
location in a state with a top 15 rank in value-added from agriculture in 2011.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Derivative 1999-2000
Population 0.0205*** 0.0141**
(0.00537) (0.00661)
Exchange City 1.514** 1.087**
(0.664) (0.546)
High Crop 0.620 0.799*
(0.432) (0.451)
Observations 366 366
McFadden’s Pseudo R-squared .5448 .4651
Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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This table presents results for regressions of weather station errors on CME derivative
introduction by cohort. For each regression, we include only the derivative stations in the
cohort of interest and all control stations. We run each regression for the years from 1999
to 3 years after the cohort’s introduction. The dependent variable is the total number
of weather station errors for each station-year observation. The regression in Column 1
includes weather stations with CME derivative introduction in year 2000 and all control
stations for the years 1999-2003. The regression in Column 2 includes weather stations with
CME derivative introduction in year 2003 and all control stations for the years 1999-2006.
The regression in Column 3 includes weather stations with CME derivative introduction
in year 2005 and all control stations for the years 1999-2008. The regression in Column
4 includes weather stations with CME derivative introduction in year 2008 and all control
stations for the years 1999-2011. The regression in Column 5 includes all observations.
Early Cohorts is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a station is in the 1999-2000 wave of
introduction and has a derivative in that year. Late Cohorts is an indicator variable equal
to 1 if a station is in the 2003, 2005 or 2008 waves of introduction and has a derivative
in that year. All regressions include station and year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by weather station.
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Table B.6: High Demand Locations and The Effect of CME Derivative Introductions
on Weather Station Errors
This table presents results from regressions of weather station errors on CME
derivative introduction where the sample is separated into high demand and
low demand locations. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the total number
of weather station errors for each station-year observation. The dependent
variable in Column 2 is the log of the total number of weather station errors
for each station-year observation. High Demand (Low Demand) is an indicator
equal to 1 if a derivative is traded on the station in that year and the station is a
high demand (low demand) location. High demand locations are locations with
a population rank in the top 25 or in the first 2 cohorts (1999 and 2000). All
regressions include year and station fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
by weather station.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Total Errors Log(Total Errors)
High Demand -2.222*** -0.189***
(0.717) (0.0626)
Low Demand -0.661 -0.0799*
(0.560) (0.0456)
Observations 634 634
R-squared 0.471 0.477
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Station Fixed Effects Yes Yes
t-test βH = βL .0576 .1140
Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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Table B.7: Active Months and The Effect of CME Derivative Introductions on
Weather Station Errors
This table presents results from regressions of weather station errors on CME
derivative introduction where the sample is separated into active and inactive
months. The dependent variable is the total number of weather station errors
for each station-year observation. The regression in Column 1 excludes all
months except April and October, the least active months based on open
interest. The regression in Column 2 includes all months except April and
October. Similarly, the regression in Column 3 excludes the top 6 active
months based on open interest. The regression in Column 4 includes includes
the top 6 active months based on open interest. Open interest for month i
is calculated by summing across all contracts the average open interest for
each contract that settles based on temperatures in month i. Derivative is an
indicator equal to 1 if a derivative is traded on the station in that year. All
regressions include year and station fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered
by weather station.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES Total Errors Total Errors Total Errors Total Errors
Derivative 0.0546 -1.714*** -0.483 -1.164***
(0.247) (0.576) (0.419) (0.415)
Observations 634 634 634 634
R-squared 0.211 0.445 0.374 0.355
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Station Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Active/Inactive Months Inactive Active Inactive Active
Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
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Table B.10: The Effect of CME Derivative Introduction on Weather Station Errors
With Temperature Controls
This table presents the results for regressions of weather station errors on
CME derivative introduction and temperature controls. Observations are at
the station-year level. The dependent variable in Column 1 is the total number
of weather station errors. The dependent variable in Column 2 is the logarithm
of the total number of weather station errors. Derivative is a dummy variable
equal to 1 in the year of CME derivative introduction on the station and
all years afterwards. Average Temperature is the average daily temperature
of a location each year. Temperature Volatility is the standard deviation of
the daily temperature of a location each year. All regressions include station
fixed effects. Columns 2 and 4 include year fixed effects. Standard errors are
clustered by weather station.
(1) (2)
VARIABLES Total Errors Log(Total Errors)
Derivative -1.592*** -0.145***
(0.565) (0.0477)
Average Temperature -0.675*** -0.0582***
(0.218) (0.0182)
Temperature Volatility -0.0183 0.00263
(0.210) (0.0180)
Observations 634 634
R-squared 0.479 0.487
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Station Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Clustered Standard Errors in Parentheses
*** p<0.01 ** p<0.05 * p<0.1
119
BIBLIOGRAPHY
120
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Admati, A. R., and P. Pfleiderer (2009), The “wall street walk” and shareholder activism:
Exit as a form of voice, Review of Financial Studies, 22 (7), 2645–2685.
Adrian, T., and H. S. Shin (2010), Liquidity and leverage, Journal of Financial Intermedi-
ation, 19 (3), 418–437.
Adrian, T., E. Etula, and T. Muir (2013), Financial Intermediaries and the Cross-Section
of Asset Returns, The Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
Aiyagari, S. R., and M. Gertler (1999), “Overreaction” of Asset Prices in General Equilib-
rium, Review of Economic Dynamics, 2 (1), 3–35.
Allayannis, G., and J. Weston (2001), The Use of Foreign Currency Derivatives and Firm
Market Value, Review of Financial Studies, 14 (1), 243–276.
Allen, F., and D. Gale (1994), Financial Innovation and Risk Sharing, MIT Press.
Becht, M., P. Bolton, and A. Roell (2003), Corporate Governance and Control, Handbook
of The Economic of Finance, vol. 1A, Elsevier North Holland.
Bellini, F. (2005), The weather derivatives market: modelling and pricing temperature,
Institute for Economic Research.
Berrospide, J., A. Purnanandam, and U. Rajan (2010), Corporate hedging, investment and
value, Working Paper, University of Michigan.
Black, B. S. (1998), Shareholder activism and corporate governance in the united states,
As published in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, 3, 459–465.
Bolton, P., V. Thadden, et al. (1998), Blocks, liquidity, and corporate control, The Journal
of Finance, 53 (1), 1–25.
Born, P., and W. K. Viscusi (2006), The catastrophic effects of natural disasters on insurance
markets, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 33 (1-2), 55–72.
Brix, A., and S. Jewson (2005), Weather Derivative Valuation: The Meteorological, Statis-
tical, Financial and Mathematical Foundations, Cambridge University Press.
Brunnermeier, M. K. (2009), Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-08, Journal
of Economic Perspectives, 23, 77–100.
Brunnermeier, M. K., and L. H. Pedersen (2009), Market liquidity and funding liquidity,
Review of Financial Studies, 22 (6), 2201–2238.
121
Brunnermeier, M. K., S. Nagel, and L. H. Pedersen (2008), Carry trades and currency
crashes, NBER Macroeconomics Annual.
Burkart, M., D. Gromb, and F. Panunzi (1997), Large shareholders, monitoring, and the
value of the firm, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (3), 693–728.
Caballero, R. J., and A. Krishnamurthy (2008), Collective risk management in a flight to
quality episode, The Journal of Finance, 63 (5), 2195–2230.
Cao, M., and J. Wei (1999), Pricing weather derivative: an equilibrium approach, Rotman
School of Management, University of Toronto.
Carter, D. A., D. A. Rogers, and B. J. Simkins (2006), Does hedging affect firm value?
evidence from the us airline industry, Financial Management, 35 (1), 53–86.
Changnon, D., and S. A. Changnon (2010), Major growth in some business-related uses of
climate information., Journal of Applied Meteorology & Climatology, 49 (3).
Chava, S., and A. Purnanandam (2011), The effect of banking crisis on bank-dependent
borrowers, Journal of Financial Economics, 99 (1), 116–135.
Cheng, I.-H., A. Kirilenko, and W. Xiong (2012), Convective Risk Flows in Commodity
Futures Markets, Working Paper.
Chincarini, L. (2011), No chills or burns from temperature surprises: An empirical analysis
of the weather derivatives market, Journal of Futures Markets, 31 (1), 1–33.
Dewatripont, M., I. Jewitt, and J. Tirole (1999), The economics of career concerns, part i:
Comparing information structures, The Review of Economic Studies, 66 (1), 183–198.
Diamond, D. W. (1989), Reputation acquisition in debt markets, The Journal of Political
Economy, 97 (4), 828.
Dixit, A. (2002), Incentives and organizations in the public sector: An interpretative review,
Journal of Human Resources, 37 (4), 696–727.
Dornier, F., and M. Queruel (2000), Weather Risk Special Report, Energy & power risk
management, pp. 30–32.
Duffie, D. (2010), Presidential Address: Asset Price Dynamics with Slow Moving Capital,
The Journal of Finance, 65 (4), 1237–1267.
Dutton, J. A. (2002), Opportunities and Priorities in a New Era for Weather and Climate
Services, Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 83 (9), 1303–1311.
Edmans, A. (2009), Blockholder trading, market efficiency, and managerial myopia, The
Journal of Finance, 64 (6), 2481–2513.
Everitt, B. S., and E. L. Melnick (2008), Encyclopedia of Quantitative Risk Analysis and
Assessment, 1 ed., John Wiley & Sons.
Fostel, A., and J. Geanakoplos (2008), Leverage Cycles and the Anxious Economy, The
American Economic Review, 98 (4), 1211–1244.
122
Froot, K., and P. G. J. O’Connell (1999), The pricing of U.S. catastrophe reinsurance, in
The Financing of Catastrophe Risk, pp. 195–232, University of Chicago Press.
Froot, K. A., and J. Stein (1998), Risk management, capital budgeting, and capital structure
policy for financial institutions: an integrated approach, Journal of Financial Economics,
47 (1), 55–82.
Froot, K. A., D. S. Scharfstein, and J. C. Stein (1993), Risk managements coordinating
corporate investment and financing policies, the Journal of Finance, 48 (5), 1629–1658.
Garleanu, N., and L. H. Pedersen (2007), Liquidity and Risk Management, American Eco-
nomic Review: Papers & Proceedings, 97, 193–197.
Garleanu, N., and L. H. Pedersen (2011), Margin-based asset pricing and deviations from
the law of one price, Review of Financial Studies, 24 (6), 1980–2022.
Garleanu, N., L. H. Pedersen, and A. M. Poteshman (2009), Demand-based option pricing,
Review of Financial Studies, 22 (10), 4259–4299.
Gennaioli, N., A. Shleifer, and R. Vishny (2012), Neglected risks, financial innovation, and
financial fragility, Journal of Financial Economics, 104 (3), 452–468.
Gillan, S., and L. T. Starks (1998), A survey of shareholder activism: Motivation and
empirical evidence, Contemporary Finance Digest, 2 (3), 10–34.
Gopalan, R. (2009), Institutional stock sales and takeovers: The disciplinary role of voting
with your feet, Working Paper, Washington University, St. Louis.
Gromb, D., and D. Vayanos (2010), Limits of Arbitrage: The State of the Theory, Annual
Review of Financial Economics, 2, 251–275.
Hayek, F. A. (1945), The use of knowledge in society, The American economic review, 35 (4),
519–530.
He, Z., and A. Krishnamurhty (2013), Intermediary asset pricing, American Economic
Review, pp. 732–770.
He, Z., and A. Krishnamurthy (2012), A model of capital and crises, The Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 79 (2), 735–777.
Heckman, J., C. Heinrich, and J. Smith (1997), Assessing the performance of performance
standards in public bureaucracies, The American Economic Review, 87 (2), 389–395.
Heinrich, C. J. (2002), Outcomes–based performance management in the public sector: im-
plications for government accountability and effectiveness, Public Administration Review,
62 (6), 712–725.
Hermalin, B. E., and M. S. Weisbach (2003), Boards of directors as an endogenously deter-
mined institution: A survey of the economic literature, Economic Policy Review, 9 (1),
7–26.
Hicks, J. (1939), Value and Capital, Oxford U.P., Cambridge.
123
Hirshleifer, D. (1988), Residual risk, trading costs, and commodity futures risk premia,
Review of Financial Studies, 1 (2), 173–193.
Holmstrom, B., and J. Tirole (1993), Market liquidity and performance monitoring, Journal
of Political Economy, 101 (4), 678–709.
Holmstro¨m, B., and J. Tirole (1997), Financial Intermediation, Loanable Funds, and The
Real Sector, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112 (3), 663–691.
Iyer, R., S. Lopes, J.-L. Peydro, and A. Schoar (2013), Interbank liquidity crunch and
the firm credit crunch: Evidence from the 2007-2009 crisis, Review of Financial Studies,
(forthcoming).
Kahn, C., and A. Winton (1998), Ownership structure, speculation, and shareholder inter-
vention, The Journal of Finance, 53 (1), 99–129.
Karpoff, J. M. (1998), The impact of shareholder activism on target companies: A survey
of empirical findings, Working Paper, University of Washington.
Karpoff, J. M. (2001), Public versus private initiative in arctic exploration: The effects of
incentives and organizational structure, Journal of Political Economy, 109 (1), 38–78.
Keynes, J. (1930), A Treatise on Money, vol. 2, Macmillan, London.
Labuszewski, J. W., and J. E. Nyhoff (2010), The CME Group Risk Management Handbook:
Products and Applications, Wiley, Hoboken, NJ, USA.
Levitt, S. D., and J. A. List (2011), Was there really a Hawthorne effect at the Hawthorne
plant? An analysis of the original illumination experiments, American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics, 3 (1), 224–238.
Lucas, R. E., Jr (1978), Asset prices in an exchange economy, Econometrica, 46, 1429–1445.
McGee, T. D. (1988), Principles and methods of temperature measurement, John Wiley &
Sons.
MDA Federal (2013), Procedural Manual, http://www.cmegroup.com/trading/weather/
files/procedure-manual.pdf/, [Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Online; accessed 2013].
Mitchell, M., and T. Pulvino (2011), Arbitrage crashes and the speed of capital, Journal of
Financial Economics.
Mitchell, M., L. H. Pedersen, and T. Pulvino (2007), Slow Moving Capital, American
Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings, (97), 215–220.
Murnane, R. J., M. Crowe, A. Eustis, S. Howard, J. Koepsell, R. Leﬄer, and R. Livezey
(2002), The weather risk management industry’s climate forecast and data needs: A
workshop report., Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 83 (8), 1193–1198.
Myers, S., and N. S. Majluf (1984), Corporate financing and investment decisions when
firms have information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial Economics.
124
Myers, S. C. (1977), Determinants of corporate borrowing, Journal of Financial Economics,
5 (2), 147–175.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (2010), NOAAs National Climatic Data
Center Sectoral Engagement Fact Sheet Energy, Silver Spring, MD.
National Weather Service (2008), Data Quality Control and Assurance Standards, National
Weather Service Instruction 10-1305, Silver Spring, MD.
National Weather Service (2010a), Climate Data Services, National Weather Service In-
struction 10-1003, Silver Spring, MD.
National Weather Service (2010b), Climate Data Services, National Weather Service In-
struction 10-1302, Silver Spring, MD.
National Weather Service (2011a), Climate Data Services, National Weather Service In-
struction 10-1004, Silver Spring, MD.
National Weather Service (2011b), Climate Records, National Weather Service Instruction
NWSPD 10-10, Silver Spring, MD.
Paravisini, D. (2008), Local bank financial constraints and firm access to external finance,
The Journal of Finance, 63 (5), 2161–2193.
Paravisini, D., V. Rappoport, P. Schnabl, and D. Wolfenzon (2011), Dissecting the Effect of
Credit Supply on Trade: Evidence from Matched Credit-Export Data, Working Paper.
Perez-Gonzalez, F., and H. Yun (2013), Risk management and firm value: Evidence from
weather derivatives, The Journal of Finance, 68 (5), 2143–2176.
Prendergast, C. (2007), The motivation and bias of bureaucrats, The American Economic
Review, 97 (1), 180–196.
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000), Weather Risk Management Association Survey.
PricewaterhouseCoopers (2006), Weather Risk Management Association Survey.
Purnanandam, A. (2007), Interest rate derivatives at commercial banks: An empirical in-
vestigation, Journal of Monetary Economics, 54 (6), 1769–1808.
Purnanandam, A., and D. Weagley (2013), Can Markets Discipline Government Agencies?
Evidence from the Weather Derivatives Market, Working Paper.
Roll, R. (1984), Orange juice and weather, American Economic Review, 74 (5), 861–880.
Romano, R. (2001), Less is more: making institutional investor activism a valuable mech-
anism of corporate governance, Yale Journal on Regulation, 18, 174.
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny (1986), Large shareholders and corporate control, The
Journal of Political Economy, 94 (3), 461–488.
Shleifer, A., and R. W. Vishny (1997), A survey of corporate governance, The Journal of
Finance, 52 (2), 737–783.
125
Stein, J. (1998), An Adverse Selection Model of Bank Asset and Liability Management with
Implications for the Transmission of Monetary Policy, RAND Journal of Economics, 29,
466–486.
Stulz, R. M. (2004), Should we fear derivatives?, The Journal of Economic Perspectives,
18 (3), 173–192.
Tufano, P. (2003), Financial innovation, Handbook of the Economics of Finance, 1, 307–335.
Wilson, J. Q. (1989), Bureaucracy: What government agencies do and why they do it, Basic
Books.
Zanjani, G. (2002), Pricing and capital allocation in catastrophe insurance, Journal of
Financial Economics, pp. 283–305.
126
